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Don't Ask, Must TellAnd Other Combinations
Adam M. Samaha* & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz**
The military's defunct Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy has been
studied and debatedfor decades. Surprisingly, the question of why a
legal regime would combine these particular rules for information
flow has received little attention. More surprisingly still, legal
scholars have provided no systemic account of why law might
prohibit or mandate asking and telling. While there is a large
literature on disclosure and a fragmented literature on questioning,
considering either part of the information dissemination puzzle in
isolation has caused scholars to overlook key considerations. This
Article tackles foundational issues of information policy and legal
design, focusing on instances in which asking and telling are either
mandated or prohibited by legal rules, legal incentives, or social
norms.
Although permissive norms for asking and telling seem
pervasive in law, the Article shows that each corner solution exists in
the American legal system. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," "Don't Ask,
Must Tell, " "MustAsk, Must Tell, " and "MustAsk, Don't Tell" each
fill a notable regulatory space. After cataloguing examples, the
Article gives accounts of why law gravitates toward particular
combinations of asking and telling rules in various domains, and
Copyright C 2015 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications. Because of an editorial mistake, an earlier version of this manuscript containing
errors was printed and bound. The corrected version you are reading now is the definitive text.
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
Sidley Austin Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Earlier drafts of this
Article benefited greatly from presentations at the University of Chicago, the University of Tulsa, the
Law, Economics, and Politics Colloquium at New York University, and the 2014 Privacy Law
Scholars Conference. For other helpful discussions and comments, we thank Derek Bambauer, Jane
Bambauer, Omri Ben-Shahar, Corey Brettschneider, Paul Crane, Ryan Doerfier, Liz Emens, Lee
Fennell, John Ferejohn, Stephen Galoob, William Hubbard, Clare Huntington, Aziz Huq, Lewis
Kornhauser, Daryl Levinson, Saul Levmore, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, Martha Nussbaum,
Randy Picker, Ariel Porat, Eric Posner, Victoria Schwartz, and Laura Weinrib. For helpful research
assistance, we thank Rucha Desai, Michelle Hayner, Ben Mejia, and Hillel Nadler. We are grateful to
the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund, as well as the Russell J. Parsons and
Bernard Sang Faculty Research Funds, for their generous support.
919
*
**

920

CALIFORNIA LA TREVIEW

[Vol. 103:919

offers some normative evaluation of these strategies. The Article
emphasizes that asking and telling norms sometimes-but only
sometimes-are driven by concerns about how people will use the
information obtained. Understandingthe connection to use norms, in
turn, provides guidance for a rapidly advancing future in which big
data analytics and expanding surveillance will make old practices of
direct question-and-answer less significant, if not obsolete. In any
event, the matrix of rule combinations highlighted here can reveal
new pathways for reforming our practices of asking and telling in life
and law.
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INTRODUCTION

Life is filled with rules about what to ask and what to tell. In a given
situation, a particular question might or might not be appropriate, and so too for
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disclosure of information-depending on the applicable mix of law, social
norms, ethical commitments, and other factors. At some level, everyone is
aware that a mixture of forces influences our decisions to seek information and
to offer it up. But legal scholars have not yet dug into how these rules work and
interact, nor into what their content should be. Rules for disclosure are the
subject of longstanding scholarly attention, of course, covering everything from
the duty to warn to the protection of classified information.' But rules for
2
asking questions have received less systematic study, and the possible
combinations of rules for asking and telling seem to lack any systematic
treatment at all.
In this Article, we examine several intriguing combinations of rules for
asking and telling. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) already has drawn
repeated scrutiny from legal scholars because of the now-abandoned policy
regarding gay people serving in the military. 3 Other combinations of asking and
telling norms can be equally interesting, however. Below we pay special
attention to extreme combinations beyond information-inhibiting DADT rules,
including the trust-based "Don't Ask, Must Tell" (DAM), the ostensibly
redundant "Must Ask, Must Tell" (MA4T), and the often regrettably
adversarial "Must Ask, Don't Tell" (MADT). To our knowledge, no one has
examined these extreme combinations together, yet each occupies a pocket of
existing law and social life.
Many of the lessons we offer below are localized within particular
combinations of asking and telling rules. These combinations are interesting
and important enough on their own, but we also want to suggest broader
lessons. We extend and integrate strands of scholarship in law and economics
4
as well as law and social norms. The notion that asking and telling norms are
1. See infra notes 34-37.
2. See infra notes 39-43.
3. See, e.g., Michelle Benecke, Turning Points: Challenges and Successes in Ending Don 't
Ask, Don't Tell, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35 (2011) (discussing the repeal as a triumph of
service members); Suzanna Danuta Walters, The Few, the Proud, the Gays: Don 'tAsk, Don 't Tell and
the Trap of Tolerance, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 87 (2011) (raising concerns about continued
heteronormativity); Eugene R. Milhizer, "Don 'tAsk, Don't Tell": A QualifiedDefense, 21 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 349, 350 (2004) (presenting DADT as a compromise between people with different
normative views on homosexuality); Tobias Barrington Wolff, CompelledAffirmations, Free Speech,
and the U.S. Military s Don 'tAsk, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (1998) (arguing
that, partly because of an assumption of heteronormativity, DADT effectively "compel[led] gay
servicemembers falsely to identify themselves as straight"); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in
Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumptionand the Case of "Don 'tAsk, Don'tTell", 108 YALE L.J.
485, 540 (1998) ("[T]he policy simultaneously dampens the empowering aspects and amplifies the
disempowering aspects of gay invisibility."). An example of a DADT proposal in a nonmilitary
context is Osamu Muramoto, Bioethics of the Refusal of Blood by Jehovah s Witnesses: Part 3. A
Proposalfor a Don't-Ask-Don 't-Tell Policy, 25 J. MED. ETHICS 463, 466 (1999) (recommending

DADT for a religious organization and its members to protect "autonomous decisions" about blood
transfusions).
4. By "social norm" we mean a standard for conduct that might be enforced by nonlegal
sanction or incentive, such as shaming or refusal to deal (or commendation or acceptance). Like law's
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best understood when taken together appeared no later than 1994, in Game
Theory and the Law. But there the focus was on comparing "Don't Ask, May
Tell" with "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Moreover, positive and normative
evaluations will be incomplete without accounting for both social and legal
norms. The real-world set of asking and telling rules changes when social
norms are added to legal norms, and so might one's evaluation of them. 6 If
nothing else, this Article facilitates integrated thinking on the actual and proper
assortment of rules for acquiring and disclosing information. We hope our
matrix of combinations is itself an important advance, but a good typology also
can help reveal policy options that would not be obvious otherwise. We do
some of that work along the way.
Part I of the Article sets out functional definitions for asking and telling,
and then offers the beginnings of positive and normative theories for regulating
asking and telling. Part II turns to concrete situations, emphasizing interesting
and counterintuitive combinations of norms. This Part concentrates on fairly
simple social interactions between two parties in which party A might ask party
B for information, and B might tell information to A. Part III adds the
possibility that A might ask a third-party C for information about B, where C
could be a person or a database. Our discussion of these "Ask C" situations is
even more provisional than the rest of the Article. But raising the Ask C issue
allows us to think about a future in which the social practice of interpersonal
Q&A becomes ever less significant. What legal norms are likely and
appropriate for that future? 7 Part III concludes by pointing to a few situations in

normative propositions, a social norm in this sense might or might not be internalized; either way, law
and social norms can influence behavior. Also, in this Article we do not take a general position on how
social norms and laws come about, either as a matter of design or spontaneous generation. Cf Robert
C. Ellickson, The Marketfor Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001) (providing one rich
account of norm development). Knowing the sources of a given rule can provide insight on the
feasibility and methods of changing the rule, and even a reason to believe that the rule is good or bad.
But we will not present a general theory of origin for the rules we study, and we trust that any
oscillation between a design perspective and a spontaneous generation perspective will not seriously
undercut our analysis.
5.
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 91-93 (1994) (discussed infra
notes 103-105 and accompanying text). A recent article that is sensibly concerned about the ability of
regulated parties to evade Don't Ask norms using, for example, big data is Scott R. Peppet,
Unraveling Privacy: The PersonalProspectus and the Threat of a Full-DisclosureFuture, 105 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1153, 1190 (2011).
6. See Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1960-61 (2001). Another
insightful contribution is Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2237, 2279-82 (1996). A kind of DADT rule can arise from efficient social norms of privacy,
which prevent gathering and disseminating information that is more harmful to a gossip target than
helpful to the gossipers. See id. McAdams claims that anti-blackmail laws might make sense if
combined with such privacy norms. See id.
7. Our treatment of database queries is much like surveillance, in which A monitors B
without any questions. In at least some cases, surveillance can be analyzed in the same way as our Ask
C situations.
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which we believe that legal and social norms for asking and telling are
probably suboptimal, and suggests reforms.
In suggesting answers for the future, we will spotlight use rules.
Sometimes people's use of information is regulated, as distinguished from how
people collect information in the first place. For example, law might prohibit
hiring decisions based on certain applicant characteristics, such as race,
whether or not law regulates asking and telling about race. Often, use concerns
must be considered to understand asking and telling rules. In other situations,
however, asking and telling rules are justified quite apart from any use rule.
One of our goals is to consider when asking and telling rules are part of a larger
regulatory mission involving the use of information, and when such rules stand
on their own. Seeing this difference in justifications for Q&A rules has
important implications for a world of rapidly expanding Ask C options.
Before going forward, caveats are in order. First, our analysis references
occasionally controversial distinctions among may, must, and don't.8 Readers
will differ on whether, for instance, loss of face, litigation incentives, or grant
conditions are enough to locate a rule beyond "may." 9 We are curious about
even modest influences on behavior, regardless, and the categorization
problems are not special to Q&A rules. Our analysis will provide insight
wherever one draws lines around contested concepts such as coercion. In the
same spirit, we will not isolate a specific normative framework to evaluate
Q&A combinations. We will offer some provisional judgments and we will
introduce a soft presumption against regulating Q&A. Still, our analysis is
designed for use by people of many different ideological stripes. Our goal is to
open up a fascinating set of social interactions for review, allowing evaluation

8. Logically, the opposite of "must ask" is "mustn't ask," rather than "don't ask." But in light
of the way we use the term "don't" and our focus on essentially free societies, we do not distinguish
"mustn't" from "don't." Free societies virtually never literally compel individuals to do things, with
the primary exception being the status of institutionalized persons, who are sometimes compelled to
eat, sleep, or refrain from travel against their will. See, e.g., Dan Lamothe, Judge Allows ForceFeeding of Detainee at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, May 24, 2014, at Al. By contrast, when free
citizens refuse to engage in an action, they may be subjected to legal penalties (such as fines or
incarceration) or severe social sanctions, but their willingness to endure these harms typically ensures
that they ultimately can disregard a "must" or a "mustn't." See generally Jonathan Jorissen, Note,
Katrina s House: The Constitutionalityof the ForcedRemoval of Citizens from Their Homes in the

Wake ofNaturalDisasters, 5 AvE MARIA L. REV. 587 (2007) (examining forced evacuations). In the
cases we describe herein, people may confront strong or moderate legal and social pressure if they fail
to comply with an obligation, but the "or else" that follows noncompliance falls short of force-feeding
or compelled sedation. Our choice of "must ask" and "don't tell" rather than "must ask" and "mustn't
tell" is driven by stylistic, not philosophical, considerations.
9. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 4285.58(c)(6)(ii) (2015) (stating that applications for agriculturalcooperative research grants should include CVs but, "[u]nless pertinent to the project, [they] should
not include .. . personal data such as birth date, martial [sic] status, or community activities"). Some
people really want agricultural-cooperative research grants. And some people really "may" exit the
regulatory jurisdiction to avoid regulation. See Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional
Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sortingfor ConstitutionalLaw and

Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 81-83, 92-97 (2013) (examining viable exit options).

924

CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW

[
103:919
[Vol.

from a wide range of normative perspectives. Often this inclusive goal and
ordinary caution will prevent conclusive recommendations, but the upside is
relevance to a much larger audience.
Furthermore, we cannot cover every possible Q&A combination. There
might be a good article to be written on "Don't Ask Twice,"' 0 "May Ask
Thrice,"" and even "Must Ask Thrice,"12 but ours will not be it. Nor will we
explore variations like "May Lie" or "Must Lie," since those have been
examined fruitfully elsewhere.1 3 We generally presume truthful telling and
non-deceptive silences.' 4 As well, many Q&A combinations are highly
contextual and embedded in larger relationship webs. Norms change as people
progress from first dates to longstanding marriages, for instance, or from oneshot interactions to repeat play. 1 5 Norms also can shift depending on whether
the asker or teller moves first. And one combination of norms might govern
interactions between A and B, while other combinations simultaneously govern
interactions between A and C or B and C. '7 We will take up much of this
complexity without exhausting it. For the time being, we lay a foundation for
heavier lifting by focusing on relationships with relatively simple dynamics. So
let's get started.

I.
WORKING CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

A.

Asking and Telling

The concepts of asking and telling might seem self-evident. To an extent,
they are. Asking questions is a part of ordinary child development that begins

10. When asked about his weight by a reporter, NBA player Darryl Dawkins responded, "It's
more than I want to tell you. And don't ask again, because I haven't hit a reporter in five years." The
Last Word, HOU. CHRON., Oct. 3, 1995, at 9.
11. See WLLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 ("Antony: You all did see that
on the Lupercal I thrice presented [Caesar] a kingly crown, Which he did thrice refuse: was this
ambition?").
12. "You do swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth[?]" 25B AM.
JUR. PL. & PR. FORMS, Witnesses § 147 (2014). The apparent norm is to answer this conjunctive
question once, rather than three times.
13. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978); Saul Levmore, A Theory of Deception and then of Common
Law Categories, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1359 (2007); Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin,A WelfaristPerspective on
Lies (unpublished May 19, 2015 manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2506309.
14. But cf infra Part II.D (examining codes of silence and evidentiary privilege assertions).
15. See Talley, supra note 6, at 1958-61 (noting that disclosure laws and social norms may
complement each other in repeat play situations, even with an error-prone judiciary).
16.
Cf J. Money, Why Are You Asking About My Salary Again?, BUDGETS ARE SEXY (Nov.
4, 2009), http://www.budgetsaresexy.com/2009/11/why-are-you-asking-about-my-salary/ (indicating
that it is socially acceptable forA to ask B about his salary ifB askedA first).
17. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 6, at 2280-81 (canvassing gossip norms, which can
depend on why and to whom communications are made).
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when toddlers realize the prospects for "social information gathering."a
Questions directed at others are inspired by the simple yet powerful recognition
that people are repositories of information. The ability to tell others what you
need or what you know also develops early in life,1 9 and might have arisen
20
earlier than questions in human history. Q&A is literally child's play. But
there are nuances to these ideas, and we want to be adequately clear about our
subjects of interest.
We are interested in a set of information problems in social settings, and
thus we concentrate on certain informational functions of asking and telling.
What people ordinarily call asking and telling have other functions that we
want to distinguish. A can ask B about something, which is our focus here, and
A also can ask B to do something (as in a favor) or to agree to something (as in
a contract).21 The latter two statements are designed to prompt action beyond
information disclosure, and we are interested in them only if they involve a
request for information from someone else.22 For the same reason, we are not

studying rhetorical questions or self-questioning.23 Telling has similar breadth
in ordinary usage that reaches beyond our study: B can tell A about something,
which is our focus here, and B also can tell A to do something (as in a
command to an inferior). Commands surely can reveal information about those
who issue them, as do questions and requests of all kinds, but we are interested

18. See, e.g., Dare A. Baldwin & Louis J. Moses, The Ontogeny of Social Information
Gathering, 67 CHLD DEV. 1915, 1925-27 (1996) (offering some theory on social information
gathering in pre-Internet terms); Lois Bloom, Susan Merkin & Janet Wootten, "Wh"-Questions:
Linguistic Factors that Contribute to the Sequence ofAcquisition, 53 CHLD DEV. 1084, 1086 (1982)
(reporting results of a small-n study indicating that "wh-" questioning started around age two or three).
19.
Cf Stanka A. Fitneva, Nietzsche H.L. Lam & Kristen A. Dunfield, The Development of
Children s Information Gathering: To Look or to Ask?, 49 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 533, 534
(2013) ("By age four, children are able to answer simple yes/no questions.... The limitations apparent
in 4-year-olds' action selection [in pursuit of an informational goal] suggest that they may . . have
difficulty selecting between direct experience and asking others.").
20. See C.E.M. Struyker Boudier, Toward a History of the Question, in QUESTIONS AND
QUESTIONING 9, 10-11 (Michel Meyer ed., 1988) (collecting and critiquing suggestions that human
beings as a class developed the ability to make assertions before the ability to pose questions).
21. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act illustrates such distinctions. Covered employers
may not request that employees take a lie detector test, see 29 U.S.C. §2002(1) (2012); cf id. § 2006
(listing numerous exemptions), and they may not ask about the results of any lie detector test that
employees happen to take, see id. § 2002(2).
22. See Tanya Stivers, An Overview of the Question Response System in American English
Conversation, 42 J. PRAGMATICS 2772, 2776-77 (2010) (distinguishing information requests from
questions initiating repair or clarification, seeking agreement, requesting something, seeking an
assessment, and so on). Professors' classroom questions inhabit an interesting border area. See AnnaBrita Stenstrdm, Questioning in Conversation, in QUESTIONS AND QUESTIONING 305, 312 (Michael
Meyer ed., 1988) ("Qs in the classroom are pseudo-Qs in that they are not primarily intended to elicit
new information, their main purpose being to check the pupils' knowledge."). If you are a professor,
think about what workshop questions are.
23.
Cf Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C.
L. REv. 227, 266 (2002) ("The questions I ask are the fundamental tool by which I discover what I do
not know.").
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in such statements only if and because they involve the production of
information.
Because we are studying functional requests for information and
functional disclosures, we have to look beyond form and pay attention to
contextual nuance. Our idea of "telling" and related terms has to go beyond flat
declarations. Questions are themselves telling, in the sense that statements
correctly formulated as questions usually reveal something about the
questioner's interests or beliefs. Every lawyer knows about phony questions, in
which an advocate during voir dire or a judge during oral argument thinly
disguises an innuendo as a formal question.24 We should recognize the asking
and telling aspects of these statements if our analysis is to be well grounded.
Even a nominal silence can reveal information via an observer's rational
inference. In a related vein, a nominal question might be understood by
listeners partly as a command, depending on the parties' perceived roles.25 We
are on the lookout for such intermingled functions in order to understand such
social interaction and the applicable norms of good behavior. In the same spirit,
we cannot restrict our idea of "asking" and related terms to statements with an
interrogative syntax. It does not matter for our purposes whether a statement
that effectively requests information ends with a question mark, a rising tone,
or any other conventional marker for a question. "I am interested in learning
26
about subject X' is an informational question under our functional definition.
A functional perspective like ours can make categorization difficult, of
27
course. Rhode Island v. Innis is a famous illustration. In police custody,
"interrogation" is supposed to stop if the detainee clearly asks for a lawyer's
28
help. Innis was arrested for armed robbery and he asked for a lawyer. On the
ride to the station, two noticeably chatty officers discussed how there was a
24. See, e.g., Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 495-96, 500-01 (7th Cir. 2007) (involving a
factual assertion embedded in a prosecutor's question); Robinson v. State, 297 N.E.2d 409, 411-12
(Ind. 1973) (granting a mistrial for voir dire questions and condemning "interrogat[ion] not with a
view towards culling prospective jurors because of bias or prejudice but to the end that bias and
prejudice may be utilized to advantage and prospective jurors cultivated and conditioned, both
consciously and subconsciously").
25. See Esther N. Goody, Towards a Theory of Questions, in QUESTIONS AND POLITENESS:
STRATEGIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION 17, 39 (Esther N. Goody ed., 1978) (considering "the conditions
under which real, that is, genuine, pure information questions are possible"). The line between request
and command has been addressed in Fourth Amendment seizure cases, for instance. See, e.g., United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) ("[L]aw enforcement officers . . may pose questions . .
provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.") (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
434-35 (1991)).
26.
Cf John Heritage, The Limits of Questioning: Negative Interrogatives and Hostile
Question Content, 34 J. PRAGMATICS 1427, 1427-28 (2002) (offering a simplistic definition of
"question" as "a form of social action, designed to seek infornation and accomplished in a turn at talk
by means of interrogative syntax" and then highlighting exceptions to the syntax requirement).
27. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
28. That is, if the police want to preserve the suspect's statements as evidence against the
suspect at trial. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 454, 458 (1994); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).

DON'TASK, MUST TELL

2015]

927

school for disabled children nearby and that a missing shotgun might end up
hurting one of them-at which point Innis asked the officers to turn the car
around so he could show them where the gun was.29 The Court majority was
willing to define interrogation broadly enough to include both "express
questioning" and its "functional equivalent" based on a reasonable likelihood
of a response,30 but the Court was not willing to classify the officers' speech as
interrogation via appeal to conscience.31 Two of the dissenters basically agreed
with the majority's test but were "utterly at a loss" to understand the majority's
32
conclusion.
Analogous disputes pop up on the boundary of telling and
revealing by other means. Judges dealing with Fifth Amendment claims try to
decide whether someone was compelled to be a "witness" via testimonial
communication of fact or opinion, or instead revealed incriminating
information via some other method such as an involuntary blood draw or
compliance with economic regulation.33 The distinction between telling and
revealing is not always easy to see or understand.
The importance of categorizing such behavior increased once legal
consequences attached. Judicial efforts to regulate police questioning or selfincrimination required definitions of things like "interrogation" and "witness,"
and disputes over the boundaries of those ideas were sure to follow. Conceptual
work will not resolve disputes like Innis, however, which depend on normative
goals. And whether or not the Court got things right in Innis, there certainly
will be borderline cases. Residual vagueness surrounds the ideas of asking and
telling, which are subjects of ongoing study by linguists, anthropologists,
sociologists, and others. But wherever one comes down on borderline cases,
there are more than enough consensus cases of asking and telling to investigate
different combinations of norms.
B.
1.

General Theories

Why Q&A?

When it comes to telling, a tall stack of scholarship offers assistance.
Academics have worked on mechanisms and normative theories for
information disclosure for many years. We already know that information is a
valuable resource and public good that "wants to be free" in some sense,34 and
that, nonetheless, useful information flows may require encouragement. Often
enough A and B are in a situation of asymmetric information regarding a
physical or financial risk to A, for instance. From the perspective of economic
29.
30.
31.
32.
(offering a
33.
34.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 294-95.
Id. at 300-01; see id. at 301.
See id. at 302-03.
Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 311-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
different functional test).
See United Statesv. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000).
STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT M.I.T. 202 (1987).
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efficiency, we can hope or recommend that any duty to disclose what B knows
about the risk to A will draw from a sense of how cheaply each person can
prevent a legally recognized harm, along with the effects on ex ante incentives
to obtain such information in the first place.35 Factors like these are familiar in
analyzing tort and contract law. On the flip side, legal scholars understand that
B often should keep secrets from A to support contractual, agency, and trust
relationships with third parties.36 Alternatively, a disclosure by B may enable A
to make a decision based on legally forbidden grounds, and so law might
restrict such information flows to prop up anti-use rules.37
Of course, our goal here is not to resolve when disclosure is better than
privacy. But the disclosure literature suggests a challenge for those interested in
questions: one might wonder whether getting society's telling rules right kills
the significance of asking rules. If a legal and social system can accurately
identify when B must, may, and must not disclose information to A, perhaps
developing asking norms for A is superfluous. Moreover, as we will emphasize,
questions themselves are almost invariably telling. Perhaps questions can be redescribed as a kind of disclosure without need for a separate category. And
existing theory on asking is indeed more limited, especially in relation to
telling norms.
Yet questions do hold a special place in social interaction-special
enough to ground ongoing conceptual, theoretical, and empirical work across
several disciplines. Social scientists have offered conceptions of questions to
distinguish information requests from other statements, for example.3 8 Scholars
also have studied how often people ask different types of questions and how
people tend to respond to differently formulated questions,39 partly to
understand norms of politeness.40 Survey researchers, for instance, have

35. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for StrictLiability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060-61 (1972) (describing a least-cost-avoider approach to tort liability);

Kronman, supra note 13, at 2 (distinguishing between information casually acquired and deliberately
discovered with reference to investigation incentives). For a famous case, see Sindell v. Abbott Labs.,
607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) ("From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able to bear
the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective product.").
36. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics ofRights in Valuable Information, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 699-70 (1980) (discussing trade secrets and incentives to invest in innovation);
24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5472 (1986) (collecting historical justifications for attorney-client privilege, including

encouragement of candid client disclosure). For a famous case, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 711 (1974) (supporting a qualified privilege based on ex ante incentives to deliver candid advice
to the President).
37.
38.

See infra Part II.B.2.
See supranotes 18-23.

39. See, e.g., Heritage, supra note 26, at 1433-44 (studying news interviews for different
reactions to negative framing at the beginning compared to the end of interviewer statements).
40. See, e.g., Penelope Brown & Stephen Levinson, Universals in Language Usage:
Politeness Phenomena, in QUESTIONS AND POLITENESS: STRATEGIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION 56, 60

(Esther N. Goody ed., 1978).
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developed strategies for getting reliable answers to "sensitive" questions.
Much of this research is foundational descriptive work without offering
positive or normative lessons that are conclusive. Thus anthropologist Esther
Goody helped unsettle the partition between asking and ordering. She found
that people may have difficulty asking those of a different social status purely
information-seeking questions, given the audience's tendency to perceive
questions as bundled with either a command or an inappropriate challenge to
42
status.4 Such findings suggest that designing effective norms for asking and
telling can be tricky, whether or not Goody's ethnographic study generalizes
perfectly.43
Even these modest beginnings are enough to indicate distinctive functions
for informational questions. A question is a special device for information
collection: it is an interactive call for information that alerts an audience to the
collection effort and that usually reveals something about the questioner, but
in a special sense and with a special function. Questions reveal somebody's
interest in and comfort with additional information on a given topic, unlike
concealed surveillance and other non-interactive research. And these
revelations tend to increase the probability of a responsive disclosure without
guaranteeing an answer. 5 Questions alert audiences to curiosities that might
otherwise be ignored, which enables audiences to provide thoughtful answers
or silence, and to avoid wasteful guessing about the interests or comfort level
of other people. All of this is fairly obvious but still important. Merely
permitting disclosure is an awfully hit-or-miss way to achieve informed,
targeted, and voluntary communicative exchanges. Furthermore, social and
legal systems cannot, in fact, accurately identify all and only the true
informational interests of a diverse population across all circumstances. People
writing mandatory disclosure rules for prescribed conditions cannot possibly
foresee every instance in which information should be exchanged, even if those
rules were perfectly enforced.
Try imagining a world without people asking each other questions and
therefore without answers to questions. This is a nightmare scenario, is it not?
People would not be entirely silent, but the lack of social interaction through
Q&A would be terrible. All too often the social system would misfire, with
people dumping unwanted information on others and failing to provide wanted
41. See, e.g., Kent H. Marquis et al., Response Bias and Reliabilityin Sensitive Topic Surveys,
81 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 381, 386-87 (1986) (attempting to measure the magnitude and character of the

self-reporting problem).
42. See Goody, supra note 25, at 38-39 (stressing that questions "carry messages about
relationships"); see also Karen L. Pliskin, Verbal Intercourse and Sexual Communication:
Impediments to STD Prevention, 11 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 89, 92, 99 (1997).

43. See Goody, supra note 25, at 20 (presenting her study of a Ghanaian community as a
beginning for understanding connections between asking and commanding).
44. A question that someone literally must ask does not reveal much about that person,
although the actual message received by the audience depends on what they (think they) know.
45. On reasons for increased responsiveness, see text accompanying note 94, below.
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information that they would be happy to give. Adding questions to our social
practices can facilitate individually and socially enriching information
exchanges in a world-our world-where everybody knows something and
nobody knows everything.
2.

Q&A Unbound

At this early stage and bracketing the disclosure rules referenced above,
a normative presumption in favor of individual choice in asking and telling
might be attractive. This is consistent with what some people do when they
contemplate the voluntary exchange of goods and services. The same
presumption might apply when we evaluate the rules for information exchanges
in the form of questions showing curiosity and answers meant to satisfy those
curiosities. If so, "May Ask, May Tell" is the best default combination of
norms. In general, each of us would have the choice to express our interests in
information and to decide whether to fulfill the information requests of others,
without the threat of legal or social penalty.
Sometimes societal indifference to Q&A choices can be attributed to very
low stakes. The state really does not care whether individuals eat with forks or
chopsticks in East Asian restaurants; waiters may ask patrons which they prefer
but need not, while customers may tell waiters about their preferences but need
not. In other examples, the stakes are higher but the magnitude and direction of
the tradeoffs are uncertain, at least to outsiders. Employment reference checks
in the private sector are generally May Ask, May Tell. If restaurateurs are eager
to learn how a wait-staff applicant performed in a prior job, they may call the
previous employer, who may be forthcoming or reticent. Balancing the costs
and benefits of such reference checks is quite context sensitive, implicating
thorny issues of employee mobility, employment discrimination, wage
pressure, and potentially even competition law. Private ordering might be the
best we can do. Law's role could be restricted to enforcing voluntary
agreements to disclose information and keep secrets.
Often law does look this libertarian, well beyond the famously formal
right to remain silent during police interrogations.49 Indeed, a potentially large
46. See supratext accompanying notes 34-37.
47. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit
Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359 (2003) (discussing the possibilities and limitations of private
ordering).
48. In closely related contexts like criminal history checks for job applicants, jurisdictions
sometimes codify their beliefs that some lines of questioning are off limits. See infra notes 228-230
and sources cited therein (discussing the dynamics arriving from "ban the box" initiatives).
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). There are complications for a
libertarian story in this setting, aside from subtle pressures on relatively unsophisticated arrestees.
Airandawarnings require law enforcement to inform arrestees of their right to remain silent, see id.,
so that a segment of the interaction is "May Ask, AMJust Tell" (about suspect rights). Furthermore, many
police jobs come with an implicit if not formal or judicially enforced duty to investigate crime, cf
Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003) (indicating "a further duty to
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number of laws restricting asking and telling would draw serious constitutional
objections. A legal command to stifle particular honest questions 0 or to stem
the flow of certain truthful information5 ' looks much like the kind of contentbased regulation that judges condemn.52 So, too, for commanding that people
disclose some category of information 53 or that people ask some category of
*54
questions.
True, free speech doctrine is a work in progress and there are strong
countercurrents in existing doctrine. For instance, judges shy away from using
speech doctrine against contracts. Indeed, whole categories of challenges get
only modest traction with judges, including public employee claims56 and
business resistance to the disclosure of facts to consumers. In addition,
nobody really thinks to raise free speech objections within entire fields of law,
such as tort law's duties to warn.5 8 We will not examine the First Amendment
issues in detail, but it is worth noting that constitutional problems might
reinforce other normative doubts about departing from May Ask, May Tell. If
nothing else, constitutional questions can inhibit the creation of legal norms for
asking and telling, such that social norms-including political correctness,

investigate" before making a probable-cause arrest if "the complaint would lead a reasonable officer to
be suspicious"); Pete's Towing Co. v. City of Tampa, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(defending police officers against a harassment suit by reference to their duty to investigate), so
interrogation itself can be characterized as "AJust Ask, May Tell."
50.
Cf Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (mentioning
"[t]he right of citizens to inquire").
51. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop Peoplefrom Speaking
About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057-58 (2000) (criticizing information privacy duties beyond
contract); cf Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
CoLuM. L. REV. 1650 (2009) (studying possible free speech objections to legal duties of
confidentiality).
53. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995) (involving the
identity of a political leafleteer); cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20 (1984)
(holding that government-required disclosure of trade secrets may constitute a taking).
54. To our knowledge, "Must Ask" rules have not been subject to free speech litigation.
55. See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 670-71 (1991) (relying on a generally
applicable legal duty to keep promises or pay up).
56. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
57. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651-53 (1985); Am. Meat
Inst. v. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying Zauderer beyond anti-deception
efforts to country-of-origin labeling). But cf R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205,
1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (condemning graphic cigarette warnings).
58. See, e.g., CASS R. SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH Xii
(1993); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the FirstAmendment Dog
that Didn'tBark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23-28; Robert Post, Understandingthe FirstAmendment, 87
WASH. L. REV. 549, 552 (2012) (claiming that "the rule against content discrimination is applied in
only limited circumstances"); see also Helen Norton, You Can 't Ask (or Say) That: The First
Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on DecisionmakerSpeech, 11 WM. & MARY BLL RTS. J.
727, 728-29 (2003) (defending regulation of employer questions to protect Don't Use norms).
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patriotism, and politeness-would become the only available mechanism for
social control.
May Ask, May Tell might feel equally familiar in our ordinary social
lives. A sense of free inquiry and open response is especially familiar to
academics like us, who spend a good part of our working lives formulating
questions for ourselves and others to answer. But it is easy to overstate people's
freedom to ask and tell without social or emotional penalty. Many people are
told or instinctively follow a general rule against talking to strangers, outside of
defined scripts. Most people have very limited face-to-face communication of
any kind with strangers and even acquaintances 59 (sidewalk preachers aside).
"How are you?" is not actually an attempt to collect information most of the
time, nor is "Fine, thanks" expected to be an informative answer. Such polite
interactions are safe harbors for interpersonal situations, allowing people to
display sociability in an unthreatening way. That said, people do constantly
engage in Q&A with acquaintances without much sense of obligation one way
or the other, within a number of topics. Generalizations are a bit hazardous
here. But probably the closer the personal relationship, and the more
impersonal the form of communication, the greater the freedom for individual
choice over Q&A without social penalty.
As a rule of thumb, then, our law tends toward May Ask, May Tell, while
our social norms often push toward more inhibited combinations. This
impression renders it worth considering the reasons why social groups and, at
least occasionally, legal institutions might depart from May Ask, May Tell. A
complete response would require a full account of ethical, social, and legal
norms governing all questions and answers, along with convincing positive and
normative theories for the prevailing rules, which cannot be done in an article.
Instead we offer illustrative social and legal norms in particular settings. And
we suggest clusters of plausible justifications for such regulatory norms, even if
we cannot fully explain their development. For building blocks, we take up
asking and telling norms separately.
3.

Regulating Telling

Social norms for telling often are clear. If asked and if you know, you are
more or less obligated, as a member of the community in good standing, to tell
the time of day. For free. True, you won't be run out of town if you object to
others free riding on your investment in discovering the time of day, or if you
plead with people to consider the ex ante incentive effects for everyone

59. See Elizabeth W. Dunn & Michael Norton, Op-Ed., Hello, Stranger, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 27,
2014, at SR6. There is local variation in practices. See Peter J. Rentfrow, Introduction, in
GEOGRAPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: EXPLORING THE INTERACTION OF ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR 3

(Peter J. Rentfrow ed., 2014) ("[A] slight nod and smile to a stranger is an acceptable greeting in
Austin, Texas, but such behavior would be considered an affront in New York City and possibly
perverted in London.").
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concerned if you cough up the information without payment. And you might
evade social penalties by feigning ignorance with a quick, "Sorry." But you
should feel badly about that response. 0 Similar observations apply to a social
norm in favor of warning people who you know are in the dark, even strangers,
about known risks of physical harm. "Watch out" is basically a free service. On
the flip side, people operate under a general rule against reporting bad news. If
you don't have anything positive to say, don't say anything at all-unless
you're a reporter.6' A softer norm is to avoid distracting or unsettling people
with "too much information," whether personal or not.
We also live with nuances and complexities in telling norms. On the one
hand, generally people are supposed to keep their friends' secrets, to build and
maintain trust. On the other hand, there is a general norm in favor of reporting
crimes to authorities who can respond effectively (and without blood feuds). So
secret-keeping norms and crime-reporting norms may clash. Dramatic
examples include codes of silence within sub-communities of certain police
62
6
departments. Consider also social norms against gossip,63 and countervailing
norms that tend to encourage it. Passing on supposedly true tidbits about
people's so-called private lives is condemned by many, vocally, as degrading
the gossipers and perhaps the subject of the gossip, while distracting the
65
listening public from weightier matters. Yet gossip is a kind of currency, too,
which can show that the gossiper is "in the know" and therefore a valuable
social node. Finally, gossip is widely understood to be a low-cost tool for
maintaining social control; the fear of becoming the target of negative gossip
66
prompts individuals in close-knit communities to adhere to social norms.
.

60. Note that many Must Tell norms are conditionalon being asked. There is no norm in favor
of repeatedly calling out the time of day without being asked. Again, asking a question informs
listeners of the questioner's interests and may avoid wasteful guessing and infornation overloads.
Compare junk mail.
61. Cf Adam Waytz et al., The Lesser Minds Problem, in HUMANNESS AND
DEHUMANIZATION 49, 53 (Paul G. Bain et al. eds., 2014) (explaining that studies indicate "the
tendency for people to keep negative emotions hidden or private," and a resulting underestimation by
observers of the amount of negative emotion experienced by friends and peers).
62. See, e.g., John Kleinig, The Blue Wall ofSilence: An EthicalAnalysis, 15 INT'L J. APPLIED
PHIL. 1, 4-7 (2001) (offering a nuanced account of such codes as an outgrowth of associational
bonding and loyalty); Neal Trautman, Truth About Police Code of Silence Revealed, 49 LAW & ORD.
68 (2001) (reporting results of an officer survey); infra Part lI.D.1.
63. See McAdams, supra note 6, at 2280-81 (presenting many examples of Don't Ask and
Don't Tell anti-gossip social norms and their context sensitivity).
64. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 57 (1991) ("[P]eople in [Shasta
County, California's] Oak Run area 'gossip all the time."').
65. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890); Nicole Winfield, Pope in Blistering Critique of Vatican Bureaucrats: Christmas
Message Rebukes "Hypocritical"Cardinals, Bishops, and Urges Them to Be Joyful, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Dec. 23, 2014, at Al (quoting Pope Francis's remarks referencing the "terrorism of gossip"
that can "kill the reputation of our colleagues and brothers in cold blood").
66. See ELLICKSON, supra note 64, at 213-15.
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With these complexities, gossip is a somewhat constrained and yet vibrant
practice in our society.
We are now touching on legal norms, given that garden-variety tort law
includes various duties to warn relative strangers and that other positive law
may require people to report suspected crimes to government officials.6 8
Another well-known example is that agency officials are obligated to hand over
certain government records to those who ask for them under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). 69 These are Must Tell laws. On the flip side, a famous
Don't Tell legal norm comes from the system of classified information. 70 A
Top Secret stamp indicates that a government official must keep the
information within a circle of people sharing similar security clearances, 7
which is a bit like keeping a friend's confidences. A favorite Don't Tell
example for lawyers also involves a principal-agent relationship. Attorneys are
usually duty bound to maintain client confidences, unless the client decides
72
otherwise.
Thus law and social norms both encourage and discourage disclosure. As
for explanations and justifications, we have alluded to standard theory on risky
information asymmetries, third-party interests, and incentive effects in
choosing between disclosure and privacy. 73 These considerations may point in
different directions in different settings, which makes for some debatable
policy choices but also helps structure inquiry into telling norms.
Don't Tell often reinforces information asymmetries to protect third
parties and to generate incentives that support valued relationships. Whether
the situation is a friend holding another friend's confidence or an official
holding a state secret, more than one person's interests are implicated. Law and
society might choose sides by requiring secrecy until all those with access to

67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 341, 345 (1965) (involving land
possessor liability for dangers unknown to those with a privilege to enter); id. § 388 (involving chattel
dangers known to the supplier).
68. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20B(a) (2014) (involving a limitation on
psychotherapist-patient privilege for a "threat of imminently dangerous activity by the patient"); U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHLD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1-2 (2014), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/ manda.pdf

(reporting that all fifty states require some class of persons to report suspected child abuse to an
agency, and that about eighteen states extend this duty to all persons); cf Mark Osiel, Rights to Do
Grave Wrong, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 107, 166-67 (2013) (expressing worry about disincentives to
seek care when caregivers are legally obligated to report suspected wrongdoing or illness); Hiibel v.
Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187-91 (2004) (upholding a state law requiring people to
identify themselves upon request by police officers, as applied to a proper investigative stop involving
no apparent risk of compelled self-incrimination).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
70. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003); Adam M. Samaha,
Government Secrets, ConstitutionalLaw, and Platformsfor JudicialIntervention, 53 UCLA L. REV.

909, 937-40 (2006).
71. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §798(a)-(b) (2012).
72.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).

73.

See supraPartI.B.1.

DON'TASK, MUST TELL

2015]

935

the information consent to further disclosure. Moreover, law's support for
Don't Tell may increase the chances of disclosure in the first place, thereby
promoting socially beneficial trust relationships.7 4 Of course, privacy can
promote criminal conspiracies and corrupt governments, too, but the doubleedged nature of many privacy norms is a reason for careful attention to context.
Additionally, a Don't Tell norm might be sensible even if one particular
disclosure has no immediate negative effect. With unraveling, one person's
revelation of information may prompt observers to make rational inferences
about everyone who tries to remain silent, and in this sense interfere with their
75
choices to reveal or conceal. The felt threat of unraveling may be related to a
Don't Use norm. If a particular ground for decision is forbidden, forbidding
disclosure of information may prevent such decisions.
Must Tell norms generally attack information asymmetries to protect the
interests of those outside the loop, sometimes despite problematic incentives.
Consider duties to warn strangers. 6 Such burdens of disclosure might lack
grounding in interpersonal agreements or trust relationships, but other
justifications enter the picture. At least with a least-cost-avoider idea in play,
there are circumstances in which a quick warning from people who happen to
have knowledge will prevent bad outcomes for others, without overloading
them with information or intolerably weakening the incentives for discovering
hazards. Miranda warnings might fit here, as well; the hope is that they help
suspects make informed judgments at little cost to police officers who ought
to know about these rights anyway. Even social norms in favor of telling the
time when asked have a similar defense. Agency relationships may point
toward disclosure, too, albeit to principals. Agents have and should have
various duties to inform their principals, such as when lawyers conduct internal
investigations for corporate clients,79 or government officials respond to FOIA
requests.80

&

74. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (recognizing a psychotherapist-patient
evidentiary privilege on the ground that "the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development
of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment").
75. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 91-93; Anita L. Allen, CoercingPrivacy, 40 WM.
MARY L. REV. 723 (1999).

76. Most jurisdictions are reluctant to impose legal duties in these situations, see, e.g., Harper
v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Minn. 1993), though many people feel morally obliged to
render assistance and some jurisdictions have created legal duties to rescue a stranger if the act of
rescue exposes the rescuer to no risk of harm. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community ofAid: A
Rejoinder to Opponents ofAffirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 5-15, 22-30
(1993).
77.

See supranote 35.

78. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611-12 (2004) (plurality) (referring to informed
choice as an objective of Miranda).
79. See, e.g., SEC v. Roberts, 254 F.R.D. 371, 382 (N.D. Cal. 2008). See generally Veronica
Root, The Monitor-"Client" Relationship, 100 VA. L. REv. 523, 537-38 (2014) (discussing internal
and external investigations).
80. See supranote 69.
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RegulatingAsking

On the asking side, many social norms are highly contextual but
nonetheless common knowledge. 8 ' Asking how much money someone makes
is usually bad form in the United States, maybe because neither employees nor
their employers want to be shown up, except perhaps on Wall Street. 82In
contrast, socially adept adults are more or less required to ask toddlers
questions when interacting with caregiving parents, a popular one being "How
old are you?" But at some point it becomes inappropriate to ask a woman her
age,83 and perhaps a softer rule applies to men as well. On the other hand, the
social norm in favor of asking seems to reappear with respect to anyone who
appears to be impressively old.8 4
For disabilities, the social norm is against asking a person about their
apparent mental or physical impairments, not to mention any question that
sounds like, "What's wrong with you?" Such questions, especially from
strangers, can trigger feelings of insult or intrusion, even though questions
about disability are not always unwelcome. In fact, "Do you need help?"
sometimes is socially mandatory. Interestingly and sometimes confusingly,
when we move from disability to what people consider injury, Must Ask norms
can appear again. Although there is usually some risk of unwelcome
86
invasiveness, the friendly question, "How did you break your leg?" is socially
appropriate if not required. In a related vein, we have had the off-putting
experience of dining with people who fail to ask us a single question during the

&

81. See, for example, click-bait stories like Jackie Pilossoph, 10 Questions You Should Never
Ask Someone You ve Been Datingfor Less than a Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2013, 1:58 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jackie-pilossoph/10-questions-you-should-n-b4281387.html;
Kathryn Tuggle, 10 Questions You Must Never Ask Your Boss, THE STREET (Nov. 20, 2013, 7:30
AM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/12114525/1/10-questions-you-must-never-ask-your-boss.html.
82. For suggestions that this norm is fading among social media-saturated Millennials, see Jen
Doll, Could Millennials End Salary Secrecy?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 17, 2013, 2:02 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/04/could-millennials-end-salary-secrecy/3 16182/.
83. See, e.g., Susan Sontag, The Double-StandardofAging, in ON THE CONTRARY: ESSAYS
BY MEN AND WOMEN 99, 99-100 (Martha Rainbolt & Janet Fleetwood eds., 1984) (excepting
bureaucrats from the "taboo" and proceeding to critique societal ideals for women that help produce
discomfort over such questions).
84. On television, birthdays of children and exceptionally elderly people are celebrated, but
there is no public party for reaching the stage of just plain old.
85.
Compare Elizabeth F. Emens, Shape Stops Story, 15 NARRATIVE 124, 128-31 (2007)
(exploring the ideas that discussing disabilities can be empowering but also beleaguering, and that
some people welcome relief from what-happened-to-you questions), with Anthony Villarreal
Jessica Villarreal, I Didn't Even Recognize Myself STORYCORPS, http://storycorps.org/?p=40687 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2015) (recounting experiences of an Afghanistan veteran and burn victim, who thought,
"Man, people don't know how to ask questions. They just want to stare and point.").
86. See LESLIE JAMISON, THE EMPATHY EXAMS 3 (2014) (flagging the difficulty of properly
showing empathy without becoming unduly invasive).
87. Along with "How are you?" this question is used to illustrate a lawful inquiry under the
Americans with Disabilities Act in EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: DISABLITY RELATED
INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER
DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) § B. 1 (July 27, 2000).
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meal, and it was hard not to infer narcissism. Depending on the context, then,
either asking or not asking can give rise to offense and some kind of social
penalty.
Law incorporates various norms for asking questions, too, although not
the exact same norms. Don't Ask shows up most famously when police officers
must stop questioning suspects in custody after they ask for a lawyer, at least if
the officers care about admissibility of suspect statements.88 Other examples
arise from antidiscrimination law in the employment context, although there
are fewer formal Don't Ask provisions than you might think. 89 Must Ask laws
are easiest to find in restricted markets, where only some people are entitled to
buy. Sellers of alcohol, tobacco, guns, and prescription drugs are sometimes
legally obliged to check buyers' ages or other characteristics. 90 Additional
Must Ask duties emerge from contractual and principal-agent relationships.
Federal government employees with long-term access to federal facilities must
answer a series of questions as part of a background check-and so some
current government employee is obligated to ask these questions. 91 Indeed, any
agency with an investigative mission includes a Must Ask norm for its
92
employees, from Census Bureau canvassers to beat cops. A variety of private
sector employees have contractual or other legal obligations to ask questions on
behalf of others, including lawyers hired by clients.93
Positive and normative theory is not well established for such asking
norms. Asking norms are undoubtedly connected to goals of discouraging or
encouraging information flows, as are telling norms, but more is at stake. A
good starting point is to wonder why questions from A would increase the
probability of responsive disclosures by B. Questions reveal someone's interest
in and comfort with more information on a given topic, but someone else must
decide to respond. Several familiar explanations present themselves: (1) B
might answer A out of generosity or altruism, perhaps acting as a good citizen

88.

See supranote 28.

89. See infra Part II.A.2. There are analogous restraints on asking in private associations. See
infra Part IB.1 (discussing religious confession). After a round of publicity about scouts asking
prospective players questions designed to reveal sexual orientation, the National Football League
adopted a code with the following language:
Coaches, General Managers and others responsible for interviewing and hiring drafteligible players and free agents must not seek information concerning or make personnel
decisions based on a player's sexual orientation. This includes asking questions during an
interview that suggest that the player's sexual orientation will be a factor in the decision to
draft or sign him. Examples: Do you like women or men? How well do you do with the
ladies? Do you have a girlfriend?
NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, EXCELLENCE IN WORKPLACE CONDUCT: SEXUAL ORIENTATION

90.
91.

(2014).

See infra note 177.
See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 139-41 (2011) (discussed infra Part II.C.1).

92. See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 507-08 (2002) (describing compulsory and nonpermissible questioning of citizens by census takers).
93. Think of public opinion poll workers, waiters and waitresses, tax preparers, or employees
tasked with interviewing job applicants.
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by responding to the identified informational need of another person. Generous
community-building behavior, including telling time or giving directions,
implicates the virtues of voluntary interaction. (2) B might answer A as part of
a bargain that society supports, offering information valued by A in exchange
for something valued by B. Answering questions can build credit with the other
party, discharge debts, or otherwise fulfill existing contractual or agency duties
that are socially desirable. (3) Or B might answer A because of unwelcome
pressure that society condemns, often labeled coercion. These scenarios need
not fit any attractive model of voluntary interaction, even acknowledging that
the boundaries of coercion are contested. 94
Thus one simple reason for Don't Ask is to prevent unwelcome pressure.
Following scholarship like Goody's and cases like Innis, we know that
questions can feel like commands to disclose. Police interrogation and certain
employer-employee relations fit here. Equally important, pressured disclosures
pose more than one risk. The loss might be to B's autonomy alone, but also
could involve the accuracy and reliability of the information received by A
(consider torture-induced confessions). Furthermore, we might worry about
how A will use the information even if B's response is perfectly accurate. Don't
Ask norms can be part of larger efforts to bolster Don't Use norms,95 with
coercive questioning being one method of fueling decisions on prohibited
grounds. Employment discrimination law is a plausible example here, too
(while police interrogation is not). A related concern about involuntary
disclosure returns us to unraveling, which is part of the Don't Tell story. 96

Once questioning draws attention to a topic, rational inference may prevent
anyone from effectively remaining silent, thereby revealing information on
which we would rather not have decisions made.
Worrisome questions occur even when no one is browbeaten, however,
and often Don't Ask is used to promote secrecy. Don't Use norms might
reemerge here as well. A simple question may increase the probability of
voluntary disclosure by those who want to take advantage of the questioner's
interests. A prospective employee gaining favor by accurately answering an
employer's question about family status or religion, for instance, will not
dissipate other people's objections to employers making hiring decisions on
those grounds. If these questions can be limited, B might not know enough to
cater to A's interests. 97 In this respect Don't Ask norms functions like Don't
Tell norms, where an attempt is made to prevent a class of people from
revealing their interests. And this helps justify prohibitions on employers

94. Finally, B might be under pressure from a regulatory legal or social norn, which we are
attempting to explain here. For a note on coercion's boundaries, see note 8 above.
95. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 91-92.
96.
97.

See supranote 75.
Cf BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 93 (suggesting that Don't Ask laws for employers are

pointless if applicants know the employer's preferences and may tell).
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asking questions about certain employee characteristics. 98 Perhaps the archaic
social norm against asking an adult woman her age is best defended along these
lines, as reinforcement for a Don't Use norm, if not relief from incentives to
prevaricate.
Don't Ask norms do more than support anti-coercion goals and Don't Use
norms, though. Friendly questions and equally friendly responses can
jeopardize trust relationships, even where use of the information is
unobjectionable. B may have an ongoing contractual, agency, or other trust
relationship with a third party that would be violated by disclosure to A.
Perhaps questions increase the chances of a breach, and therefore reduce ex
ante incentives to create these trust relationships. Another concern unrelated to
use is that questions can injure the questioner. A's questions can reveal
interests, beliefs, or ignorance in ways that insult or offend B, or that an
audience might take advantage of. Deterring questions about disability might
be built on assumptions (accurate or not) that the targets of such queries are
vulnerable if the topic is opened. Injury could be distinguished as a presumably
temporary condition that people usually are strong enough to discuss.
Similarly, to the extent a question suggests a problematic norm, we might be
better off without this tell. Social norms can be socially harmful, and freedom
to question might reinforce a perception, perhaps inaccurate, that a harmful
norm prevails. Certain workplace Don't Ask norms (religion, family status,
sexual orientation, and so on) can be partly defended if not explained by these
thoughts.
Must Ask norms might seem more difficult to understand, except as
friendly reminders to inform oneself or to show interest in other people. 99
Asking little kids their age falls within these parameters. In law, leading
examples again suggest support for use norms-this time Must Use norms that
indicate secrets must be exposed to protect other people. Consider restricted
markets, in which the government wants commercial transactions limited but
not eliminated. Alcohol sellers might want to sell to anybody with cash (no
questions asked, as the saying goes), but law is supposed to make them alert to
purchaser traits and use that information to discriminate. 00 Third-party

98. See infta Part II.A.2 (collecting prohibited and disfavored questions). Some employers
might want law to assure employees that employment decisions will not be based on certain grounds,
such as race or religion, and welcome the command or incentive to avoid asking questions about those
characteristics.
99. Sometimes people need encouragement to ask questions when they are too afraid of
suggesting their ignorance to others, such as in lecture halls, faculty workshops, and job interviews.
But this reason for a must-ask-something rule seems less likely to appear in law.
100. A Must Ask norm could be designed to prevent telling revelations about questioner
interests. If everyone knows that a group is compelled to ask a question, then asking will not reveal the
questioner's independent interests. Perhaps this is a plausible part of the compromise in some
restricted product markets, such as firearms, where government-mandated questions might protect the
most conscientious sellers from standing out to their most libertarian customers. Another version of the
idea involves perceptions of suspicion. Mandatory Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

940

CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW

[
103:919
[Vol.

protection explanations are likewise plausible in contractual and agency
relationships. These relationships can yield a legal duty to serve a principal by
posing questions to someone else. Good detectives and diligent census takers
return to mind. In addition, a legal duty to investigate may be triggered even if
the beneficiaries are not easily classified as principals. One example involves
social security proceedings conducted by administrative law judges, who have
an obligation to investigate the facts and administer the law correctly even
when the party representatives are falling short on their own duties to others.101
II.
CURIOUS COMBINATIONS

We now have a sense of why asking and telling are sometimes regulated,
although the reasons are diverse. Often the regulatory goal is to encourage or
discourage information flows, sometimes with a further goal of influencing
either the use of information or instead the strength of relationships based on
contract, agency, and trust. In these cases, we might hope or expect that asking
and telling norms will point in the same direction-encouraging both asking
and telling so that key information will be used, for instance, or discouraging
both so that it will not. Sometimes, however, the goal is different. For instance,
asking norms may reflect worries about coercive pressure rather than worries
about information use or trust relationships per se. Furthermore, agency
relationships can generate a variety of asking and telling norms that might be
defended, especially if observers cannot know whether disclosure or secrecy is
best before a particular conflict arises. In these cases, there is much less reason
to hope or expect that asking and telling norms will point in the same direction.
And, realistically, some combinations will be ill considered or the goals
confused and compromised by administrative convenience and other factors.
The next step is to draw from the general lessons suggested above and
investigate more concretely how asking and telling norms interact. Even less
theorizing exists on asking-and-telling combinations than on asking or telling
in isolation.102 And of course people will disagree about the best explanation
and the proper norms for many situations. But the clusters of reasons that we
have identified provide a rough structure for further inquiry. Moreover, by

screening questions at airports, which we discuss in Part III.C, were posed to all air travelers, even
people very unlikely to fit any danger profile. One possible justification for this over-inclusion is so
that those who TSA agents actually suspected of being dangerous were not tipped off.
101. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000) ("Social Security proceedings are
inquisitorial rather than adversarial."); see also United States v. Romero, 749 F.3d 900, 906-07 (10th
Cir. 2014) (involving police officers' duty to investigate whether a person has authority to permit entry
if presented with ambiguous facts) (citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(g), at
180 (4th ed. 2004)).
102. An exception is the work in linguistics on question-response pairs. See Stenstrm, supra
note 22, at 306-08 (collecting and summarizing linguistics sources). Another is game theory on Don't
Ask, May Tell, discussed below.
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examining the extreme corner cases where each of the norms is either "Must"
or "Don't," we get a better picture of how asking and telling norms can and
should fit together, sometimes in counterintuitive ways. And, ultimately, we
might better understand the scope and justifications for allowing people to ask
and tell in relative freedom. To show where we are headed, Figure 1 presents a
spectrum of examples, with shaded cells denoting combinations that will
receive less of our attention. Some of our characterizations might be debated,
but each cell can be filled for some set of circumstances.
FIGURE

1. Social and Legal Norms for Asking and Telling

MUST TELL
MUST ASK

MAY TELL

toddler's age

friend's injury

* employee background
checks

police interrogations (as to job
duties and formal rights)

* income taxes

certain disability
accommodations (perhaps)

* restricted markets (e.g.,
alcohol, firearms)
MAY ASK

DON'T TELL
certain journalist/politician
interactions
code of silence conflicts
civil discovery plus
privilege (as to the
attorneys)

Sexually transmitted
diseases before intercourse
* FOIA requests

therapeutic nondisclosure
social norms for many settings
legal norms for most settings

* abortion disclosure laws

Fair Housing Act on
neighborhood racial
demographics
* nondisclosure agreements

* child abuse reporting
* Brady disclosures
DON'T ASK

marital infidelity

acquaintance's disability

* employee's disability plus
tort duty to warn

family status injob interview
Fair Housing Act on
homebuyer preferences
regarding race or religion
employer questioning regarding
worker preferences on
unionization drive

A.

physical appearance in
certain orchestral auditions
employment law plus
social norms for some
protected classes
old military policy (partial)
inadmissible evidence at
trial

Don'tAsk, Don't Tell (DADT)

Start with the extreme combination that should be easiest to rationalize:
DADT has an established game theoretic justification, at least if we assume a
Don't Use rule. Douglas Baird, Robert Gertner, and Randy Picker have
considered problems of unraveling when the legal norms are what we would

942

CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW

[
103:919
[Vol.

call "Don't Ask, May Tell, Don't Use."1 03 They observed that sometimes

formal law prohibits questions about traits-such as a federally funded school
asking about an applicant's marital status-without prohibiting people from
offering the very same information. 0 4 This combination looks senseless in the
face of strategic behavior, insofar as anyone who knows they will get an
advantage from telling will do so while observers will rationally assume that
those who remain silent have the disfavored trait. Under the unraveling
scenario, people end up signaling their type regardless of whether they are
asked or whether they remain silent. The authors suggest that "[r]ules limiting
the transfer of verifiable information should be two-sided" 0 5 (DADT, in other
words), if there are to be legal rules at all. Stopping the questioning inhibits
indications of what is expected to be told, stopping the telling helps prevent
unraveling disclosures, and both norms can work together to restrict the flow of
information on which decisions should not be made. So does our law ever
adopt DADT? Does it matter?
1.

Military Policy

The most famous illustration of DADT in law is the now-repealed policy
on gay people serving in the U.S. military. But the military's policy was never
a model of information control, let alone a commitment against the use of such
information.
Shortly after President Clinton took office, he ordered his secretary of
defense to draft an executive order "ending discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in determining who may serve in the Armed Forces." 0 6 No
such Don't Use rule was ever achieved. Instead the Defense Department
adopted a narrow Don't Ask rule: "Applicants for enlistment, appointment, or
induction shall not be asked or required to reveal whether they are
heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual." o7 The Don't Tell rule, too, was
narrow. Congress warned that "[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons
who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would
create an unacceptable

risk to .

.

. military

capability." 108 In addition to

See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 91-93.
104. See id. at 92 (listing, as well, state law restricting questions about religious or political
affiliation of applicants for government jobs, and evidentiary rules restricting questions at trial about
victim sexual history). The authors treat evidentiary privileges as "a form of inquiry limit." Id. In
contrast, we treat such privileges as a May Tell norm for clients. It makes a difference to us whether a
lawyer is forbidden from asking about a privileged matter, as well as whether another lawyer or a
witness has a right not to tell. See infra Part II.D.2.
105. Id. at 93.
106. Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1 PuB. PAPERS 23 (Jan. 29,
1993) (ordering a study and consultation, as well).
103.

107.

DEP'T OF DEF.,

NO.

1304.26,

QUALIFICATION

STANDARDS

FOR

ENLISTMENT,

APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION § E1.2.8.1, at 9 (Dec. 21, 1993) (as amended Mar. 4, 1994).
108. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, §
571(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1547 (Nov. 30, 1993) (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2006)).
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provisions attempting to cement a military policy of separation for certain
kinds of homosexual conduct and same-sex marriage,1 09 which are close to
Must Use rules, the legislation also imposed a Don't Tell rule. The statute
required separation from the armed forces if the member was found to have
"stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect,"
unless the member demonstrated that he or she did not engage in "homosexual
acts.""1 0 The statute also announced support for the administration's Don't Ask
rule."' The policy was challenged in court on constitutional grounds, including
free speech,112 but the DADT combination survived until the Obama
administration.
If we take as given a May Use rule under the old policy, perhaps as a
timid bow to political reality,11 3 then how bad of a compromise was DADT?
Truly effective constraints on asking and telling about service member sexual
orientation could deprive military officers of reliable information on which to
discriminate. Following the implications of standard game theory, a broad
prohibition on any service member or applicant telling anyone about their
sexual orientation would prevent unraveling. And a broad prohibition on
anyone in the military asking about any service member's or applicant's sexual
orientation would reduce the risks of browbeaten responses, not to mention
defensive falsehoods.
Whatever the merits of that hypothetical compromise, the actual DADT
policy had nothing like the foregoing breadth. The Don't Ask rule restricted
questioning only at the recruitment and enlistment stages, not afterward. There
was apparently no formal restriction on military personnel otherwise asking
each other about or investigating sexual orientation-although implementing

109. See id. (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. §654(b)(1), (3) (2006)).
110. Id. (formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (2006)). The caveat to the Don't Tell rule
was "unless there is a further finding ... that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a
person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts." Id. Subsequently adopted regulations declared that a member's statement that he or
she is a homosexual "creates a rebuttable presumption" of such conduct, attempt, intent, or propensity;
and that rebuttal would be considered in light of third-party testimony regarding the member's past
conduct, among other evidence. DEP'T OF DEF., NO. 1332.40, SEPARATION PROCEDURES FOR
REGULAR AND RESERVE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS §§ E2.3.1.2, E8.4.5 (Sept. 16, 1997).
111. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, § 571(d)(1) (formerly
codified in the note after 10 U.S.C. §654 (2006)). This sense-of-Congress clause went on to state, "but
the Secretary of Defense may reinstate . . . questions as he considers appropriate if the Secretary
determines that it is necessary to do so in order to effectuate the policy set forth" in the legislation. Id.
112. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 62-65 (1st Cir. 2008) (rejecting free-speech claims
against the Don't Tell part of the policy). Cook relied heavily on a supposed government purpose and
justification of using such speech as evidence of homosexual conduct, not any bad effects of such
speech itself on military operations. See id.
113. Compare Yoshino, supra note 3, at 542, which recognizes that political power and
visibility can be endogenous, and claims that "[t]he state forges a link between gay invisibility and gay
powerlessness whenever it participates in closeting homosexuals, making the invisibility of gays
mandatory rather than discretionary."
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regulations might channel investigative authority to particular officers." 4 As
for the Don't Tell rule, it applied only to service member statements about their
own sexual orientation, not to one person gossiping about another. Military and
civilian informants were left unregulated. Nor did the rule instruct service
members who were not gay to not tell. Given the other problems, unraveling
perhaps should be the last worry about the policy. But it would not be shocking
if the old policy encouraged (true and false) advertising of one's
heterosexuality.
Several of these shortfalls showed up in Witt v. Air Force,"5 which took
constitutional objections seriously. The district court explained that a (civilian)
husband sent an email to the Air Force Chief of Staff claiming that Major
Margaret Witt had an affair with his wife. During the subsequent investigation,
the Air Force collected information about Witt's relationship with yet another
woman, and Witt was later honorably discharged." 6 The actual DADT policy
hardly eliminated the ability of third parties to circulate information about gay
sex, or the authority of military officers to investigate gay sex. We can say this
while ignoring any violations of the formal DADT rules. Perhaps no critical
mass of politicians and military leaders wanted the military's practices to
change appreciably in the first place.
Thus there were many reasons to hope for the disintegration of the old
policy. Most Americans now oppose the underlying idea of excluding people
from military service simply because they have homosexual sex, might do so,
or marry a same-sex partner-whether or not they tell anyone else." This
position indicates a Don't Use rule. Plus, given a history of discriminatory
military practices, it probably makes sense to add a Don't Ask rule regarding
sexual orientation, at the very least for those responsible for military
recruitment, enlistment, and discipline thereafter. And one might think that a
Don't Ask, Don't Use combination is adequately protective such that a Don't
Tell rule is not appropriate. This would allow service members and applicants
to make their own judgments about how much of their sexual orientation to
disclose and to whom, without formal law suggesting negative consequences.
On the other hand, those supporting Don't Ask, Don't Use might reasonably
lean toward a Don't Tell rule, as a way of minimizing the risk of unauthorized

114. See David F. Burrelli & Jody Feder, Homosexuals and the U.S. Military: CurrentIssues,
in DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES ON GAYS IN THE MILITARY 3 (Brandon A.
Davis ed., 2010).
115. 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1312 (W.D. Wa. 2010) (finding facts after a trial on Witt's
constitutional claims).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Lucy Madison, Alost Support Gays Serving Openly in Military, Says CBS News
Poll, CBS NEWS (Oct. 4, 2011, 7:24 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-support-gays-serving
-openly-in-military-says-cbs-news-poll/; Lymari Morales, In U.S., 67% Support Repealing "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell," GALLUP POLITICS (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/pollI145130/Support
-Repealing-Dont-Ask-Dont-Tell.aspx.
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discrimination. Perhaps a few people who still want gay people excluded from
military service might compromise if a Don't Tell rule is part of the package." 8
Today's policy has different problems. The military is appropriately
sticking with its Don't Ask rule at the recruitment and enlistment stages.119
And it seems that the military is advertising a welcoming attitude toward gay
service members.120 Furthermore, Congress and the President repealed the
Don't Tell part of the policy,121 so that a service member's mere announcement

that he or she is gay is no longer grounds for separation. It seems that gay
service members can live their lives more openly, if they choose. And perhaps
unraveling is unlikely or tolerable if the military really will not discriminate on
sexual orientation. Unfortunately, the military's commitment against use is not
totally clear. True, the statutory repeal did remove the old references to
homosexual conduct and same-sex marriage as requiring separation.122 But the
Uniform Code of Military Justice still includes sodomy ("unnatural carnal
copulation") as an offense subject to court martial.123 Although this sodomy
prohibition is not restricted to same-sex contact, it is also not textually limited
to, say, nonconsensual or public sex.124 The Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act
of 2010 was a misnomer. Thankfully, it left in place a Don't Ask rule. But
without quite switching to a Don't Use rule, the May Tell rule is less than
comforting.
2.

AntidiscriminationLaw

As a structural matter, contemporary antidiscrimination law might look
even worse than the military's DADT policy. Take Title VII of the Civil Rights

118. See generallyDavid A. Strauss, Do It But Don't Tell Me (2009) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the authors).
119. See DEP'T OF DEF., REPEAL OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL" (DADT): QUICK REFERENCE
GUIDE 1 (Sept. 20, 2011) ("Sexual orientation is a personal and private matter. DoD components,
including the Services are not authorized to request, collect, or maintain information about the sexual
orientation of Service members except when it is an essential part of an otherwise appropriate
investigation or other official action.").
120. See Chuck Hagel, Sec'y of Def., Remarks at the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
Pride Month Event in the Pentagon Auditorium (June 25, 2013), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5262
("Our nation has always
benefited from the service of gay and lesbian soldiers, sailors, airmen, and coast guardsmen, and
Marines. Now they can serve openly, with full honor, integrity and respect. This makes our military
and our nation stronger, much stronger.").
121. See Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
Section 2(e) of this Act indicates that it does not create a private cause of action.
122. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993), repealedby Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-321, §2(b), (f)(1), 124 Stat. 3515, 3516.
123.
10 U.S.C. § 925 (2012).
124.
Cf United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 208 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (allowing court martial for
sodomy with a subordinate and distinguishing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)); United
States v. Harvey, 67 M.J. 758, 762-63 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (allowing court martial of a
representative of the military abroad for fellatio with a foreign national, as conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman).
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Act of 1964. This historic statute is designed to restrict employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and
pregnancy.125 But the statute itself does not expressly prohibit employers from
asking employees or potential employees about any of those subjects.126 Nor
does the statute prohibit employees or potential employees from telling
employers about those aspects of themselves. Formally speaking, these major
civil rights laws appear to establish "May Ask, May Tell, Don't Use" regimes.
A cagey observer might wonder whether the latter prohibition on information
use can be assured while asking and telling remain unregulated. This is the
unraveling concern all over again.
Upon closer examination, however, formal law is not so permissive.
Federal law does restrict employer questions about disability,127 and questions
about sex and family status may be limited as a condition for receiving federal
funding.128 More broadly, many state laws prohibit employer questions about a
number of protected characteristics. Several states, such as California, prohibit
employers from asking questions that indicate discrimination or discriminatory
intent on various grounds including race, color, sex, disability, age, religion,
national origin, marital status, and sexual orientation.129 Other state laws
incorporate specific restrictions on employer questions regarding protected
employee characteristics.130 Also worth noting, a few states have begun to
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
126.
See 1 GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW AND REGULATION § 2:16 (Thompson
Reuters/Westlaw 2015) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT LAW].
127. See infra text accompanying notes 160-164; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5 (2015)
(regulating creditor requests for information, with caveats); 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2015) (same). The
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, which is supposed to protect employees from
adverse employment action, appears to fit a "Don't Ask, May Tell, Don't Use" category. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2012) (restricting use); id. § 2000ff-1(b) (prohibiting employer requests for and
purchases of genetic information regarding an employee or employee family member, albeit with
several exceptions).
128. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(c)(4) (2014) (declaring that schools receiving funds from the
Department of Education shall not, for example, "make pre-admission inquiry as to the marital status
of an applicant for admission, including whether such applicant is 'Miss' or 'Mrs."' and "may make
pre-admission inquiry as to the sex of an applicant for admission, but only if such inquiry is made
equally of such applicants of both sexes and if the results of such inquiry are not used in connection
with discrimination prohibited by this part") (emphases added); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012)
(granting agency rulemaking authority in this area).
129. See, e.g., CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12940(d) (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(d)
(2012) (similar but without listing marital status); KAN. STAT. § 44-1009(3) (2014) (similar but
without listing age, marital status, or sexual orientation); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2206(2) (2015)
(similar but without listing disability or sexual orientation, while adding height and weight); N.Y.
ExEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2014) (similar but adding military status and "predisposing genetic
characteristics"); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(9) (West 2015) (covering pregnancy
and family responsibilities).
130. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2206(2)(a) (2015) (prohibiting employer inquiries
concerning race, color, sex, religion, national origin, and marital status, plus height and weight); MINN.
STAT. § 363A.08, subd. 4(1) (2014) (similar but limited to pre-employment questions, not listing
height and weight, and adding creed, public assistance status, familial status, disability, and sexual

DON'TASK, MUST TELL

2015]

947

restrict employer requests for social media passwords.131 But even in these
cases, employees and others seem legally free to disclose. The basic pattern in
formal antidiscrimination law is to regulate asking only sometimes and telling
not at all.
Of course, formal law does not fully describe the real world of
employment practices. However prevalent Don't Ask might be as a formal
legal command, many employers seem to get the message that certain questions
are inappropriate or even unlawful. And this impression might be important
regardless of the enforceability of any Don't Use rule. Acknowledging that
Title VII does not per se outlaw pre-employment questions concerning race,
color, religion, or national origin, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission nevertheless states that it "regard[s] such inquiries with extreme
disfavor.

. .

. [A]n applicant's race, religion and the like are totally irrelevant to

his or her ability or qualifications as a prospective employee, and no useful
- ,132
purpose is served by eliciting such information."
Is that message penetrating? Not to everyone, certainly. But consider the
rule-of-thumb advice for hiring procedures from an online resource directed at
startup companies.1 33 The long list of bad questions is remarkable:
In general, companies should avoid inquiries about protected activities
or characteristics, except to keep records required by equal
employment opportunity laws. In making inquiries to applicants, the
following general rules should always be borne in mind:
* Companies may ask about current address and permanent address.
They may not ask whether applicant lives with anyone or whether
applicant owns home or rents.
*
*

Companies may ask for name and position of spouse employed by
the company or a competitor of the company.
Companies may not request personal sexual information or
requests for sexual conduct.

orientation); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §955(b)(1) (2014) (similar but limited to pre-employment questions
and not listing, for example, sexual orientation); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §46a-60(a)(1 1)
(West 2015) (prohibiting employer requests for genetic information); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 561(b)(1) (2014) (regarding job-applicant health coverage). Massachusetts, by agency rule, restricts
a variety of employer questions. See 804 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.01(8)(g), 3.02 (2015) (presenting a
detailed grid of permissible and impermissible employer questions on age, sex, race, disability,
criminal records, and many other topics).
131. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §11-2-124 (2014); CAL. LAB. CODE §980(b)(1) (West 2014)
(enacted by 2012 Cal. Stat. ch. 618); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §3-712 (2015); NEV. REV.
STAT. §613.135 (2014).
132. EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 126, §2:16 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2014) (presenting EEOC guidance on pre-employment inquires related to sex that
express discrimination); King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258 n.2 (8th Cit. 1984)
(dicta relying thereon).
133.

See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, THE BUSINESS COUNSELOR'S GUIDE TO ORGANIZATIONAL

MANAGEMENT preface (Thompson Reuters/Westlaw 2015).
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Companies cannot ask about marital status; children, dependents,
child care arrangements; whether the applicant is pregnant, using
birth control, or planning to have children; names of spouse or
children; or child support obligations.
Companies cannot ask about race, ethnicity, lineage, or ancestry.
They cannot ask about languages that an applicant can speak,
write, read, or understand unless a language other than English is
required for the job.
Companies . . cannot ask how educational expenses were paid or
whether applicant still owes educational loans.
....

[C]ompanies generally may not ask about the number of

"sick days" employee used in last job, the number of workdays
missed to care for children, or whether the applicant took any
leaves of absence from last job.
*
*

*

Companies may only ask about financial or credit information if it
is clearly job-related.
Companies may ask about the number and kinds of convictions, if
companies assure that convictions do not necessarily disqualify
applicant. They cannot ask about the number and type of arrests.
Companies can only ask about applicant's height or weight, if
legitimate job qualification. 134

At least some of these off-limits questions are drawn from EEOC guidance or
lower court cases,1 35 so the liability fear is not baseless. The list directs
employers to the safe side of the street.
Quite a few employers must have the sense that many questions present
intolerable risks, whether or not posing those questions is unlawful in a strict
sense. Some of these risks are litigation related. Sometimes questions can be
used later in court as evidence of unlawful discrimination, even if law does not
outright prohibit the question. In one interchange from the 1980s (easily
mistaken for the 1880s), a supervisor reportedly asked a job applicant "how her
husband felt about her applying for the job and whether she planned to have

Id. § 30:34. A longer and more nuanced list was posted in MICHIGAN TECH, WHAT YOU
LEGAL/ILLEGAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (last updated May 16, 2013),
http://www.mtu.edu/equity/pdfs/whatyoucanandcantasklongversion8-12-04.pdf.
State law and/or
conditions on federal funding might explain such care with questioning, but litigation risk aversion and
other moral commitments might be at work. See also 30 Interview Questions You Can 'tAsk and 30
Sneaky, Legal Alternatives to Get the Same Info, HR WORLD, http://www.hrworld.com/features/30
-interview-questions-111507 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (providing a provocative list of verboten
interview questions, though the "sneaky" alternatives mentioned in the title consist largely of focusing
on information pertinent to job performance).
135. See, e.g., Barnes v. Cochran, 944 F. Supp. 897, 904-05 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (involving the
Americans with Disabilities Act); 29 C.F.R. § 1600 (2014); U.S. EEOC COMPL. MAN. § 2-II (2009)
("Cognizable Claims"). The EEOC lacks statutory authority to implement Title VII via rulemaking; its
opinions on the correct understanding of Title VII receive variable Skidmore deference from courts,
which depends on several factors. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991).
134.

CAN AND WHAT YOU CAN'T
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additional children."136 Despite this plaintiffs loss on appeal, moresophisticated and litigation-averse employers will avoid producing such
evidence. Perhaps these incentives against employer questioning count as a
functional Don't Ask norm.137
Employer risks go beyond anticipated lawsuits. Many employers will selfregulate when questions would suggest something disreputable about
management's curiosities and values. Sending those messages can drive down
morale and restrict the pool of willing employees. In EEOC v. Abercrombie
Fitch Stores, Inc.,138 a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, the
company alleged that its store managers were instructed "not to assume facts
about prospective employees" and also "not to ask applicants about their
religion." 39 Although stifling such questions can prevent constructive dialogue
about workplace accommodations-in this case, wearing a hijab in a preppy
clothing store that has something against employee "caps"1 4 0 -employer
questions about religion are problematic for more than one reason. There are
litigation as well as other economic risks from a bad signal to prospective
employees. Some applicants will wonder why a clothing store's management is
interested in religion, and often infer an unwelcoming explanation.
We are
not under the impression that Don't Ask norms prevail in every workplace on
every topic implicated by civil rights legislation, or that limited questioning
shows no unlawful discrimination. But it would be unrealistic to ignore social
norms in trying to understand the effect of civil rights law on employer
-142

questions.

136. Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 365 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
137. In a similar self-protective vein are DADT norms that arise because of concerns over
maintaining an executive's plausible deniability. White House employees might avoid disclosing
envelope-pushing conduct to the President, and a suspicious President may know not to ask hard
questions or be barred structurally from doing so, precisely so that the President can be insulated if the
conduct later comes to light. Cf Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism,100
CALiF. L. REV. 887, 914 (2012).

138. 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013), rev'd, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
139. 731 F.3d at 1112 (reporting the company's averments).
140. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. at 2031. The Tenth Circuit granted summary judgment to
Abercrombie, partly because the job applicant did not tell the company that she wore a hijab for
religious reasons, and the court relied on EEOC warnings against employer questions about religion.
See Abercrombie & Fitch, 731 F.3d at 1116, 1121, 1123, 1134-35, 1143. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, but without providing guidance on the questions employers may, must not, or must ask.
See Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S.Ct. at 2033-34 (finding adequate allegations that avoiding a religious
accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer's decision, even if the applicant did not ask
for an accommodation and the employer was not certain that a religious practice would have to be
accommodated). There is, unfortunately, nothing per se unlawful about dress codes following "a
classic East Coast collegiate style of clothing." Abercrombie & Fitch, 731 F.3d at 1111.
141. Of course, the economic and morale effects are different for businesses attempting to
develop niche markets based on religion.
142. Affirmative action programs and compliance efforts complicate the analysis. Sometimes
employers may lawfully collect data on applicants or employees to promote diversity, to operate a
traditional affinnative action program, or to monitor the organization's efforts to comply with some
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The real-life norm on the telling side is likewise far from "may" in some
of these settings. A regional social practice of tolerating discussion about one's
religion, for instance, might carry over into the workplace regardless of the use
norm in formal law, but only in those regions. Wedding rings and family
photos can be found in many, but not all, workplaces. Similarly, it is our
impression from having interviewed many candidates for jobs in legal
academia that applicants regularly volunteer information about their marital
status, especially when it is helpful to their chances (a spouse who already has
to relocate to the interviewing employer's city, for instance). That said, the
sensitivity of many people in many workplaces about many of these topics will
lean the norms toward Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Whatever employers might glean
from social network postings and third-party databases (Ask C options),
employees will not always advertise to employers that they are not pregnant,
for instance.
Returning to religion and disability, job applicants often have more than
one reason to not tell. In terms of social forces, both religion and disability
implicate sensitive topics. Employees no less than employers can feel the
awkwardness of starting conversations about either subject. Plus identifying as
religious or disabled may activate troubling pressures to perform the role in
stereotypical fashion, or maybe to explain the departure.143 In terms of legal
and economic forces, being religious or disabled provides a basis for claims to
reasonable accommodation in the workplace. If job applicants can help it,
many will not foreground traits that appear to make them more costly
employees, especially when job opportunities are scarce. True, these employee
inhibitions conceivably offer a crude mechanism for screening out low-value or
non-meritorious claims to accommodation against standard operating
procedure; a hijab-wearing job applicant might be sending a rather strong
message about her religious preferences.144 But laws designed to assist
employees have reason to adjust for inhibitions faced by both sides of an
accommodation-related conversation. i45

legal obligation. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (2014) ("Voluntary affirmative action to improve
opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and protected in order to carry out the
Congressional intent embodied in title VII."); id. § 1608.4(a) & (c) (presenting guidelines for EEOC
evaluation of voluntary affirmative action programs that include self analysis, race- and sex-conscious
goals, and monitoring). Such programs are, of course, controversial.
143. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
92-93 (2006) (objecting to certain pressures against autonomous choices to cover or uncover aspects
of one's identity or self). Of course, if the issue is employer accommodations for an employee, the
employee's traits cannot remain totally obscure. There is no sense in employers making
accommodations based on unassisted guesses. The practical issues involve designing Q&A
interchanges that are consistent with statutes and realistic about human behavior.
144. One of the issues in the case was the likelihood that an applicant wears a hijab for nonreligious reasons. See Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1118-19.
145. On the possibility of using a Must Ask rule to relieve part of the difficulty, see text
accompanying notes 289-91 below.
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Our more general point is that social norms and legal incentives certainly
influence the real world of Q&A. Thus antidiscrimination law might operate
quite differently in practice than did the military's tattered DADT policy. In the
employment setting, frequently social norms supplement legal norms against
information use. In contrast, a high degree of openness in discussing one's
(hetero)sexuality in the military would have undercut formal protections
against investigation and disclosure. A combination of legal and social norms
might regulate information flows more sensibly than legal rules alone would.
Of course, we have not exhausted the analysis and evidence on these matters, 4 6
but the above discussion helps point a way forward.
B.

Don't Ask, Must Tell (DAMT)

One might imagine situations in which employers, employees, and others
freely discuss matters of race, religion, family, and disability with no fear that
the resulting circulation of information will be used to make troubling
decisions. But people's trust tends not to stretch that far. In contrast, many
personal relationships are meant to rest on at least this much trust. To be sure,
trust-based relationships can suggest May Ask, May Tell norms, but sometimes
that sort of freedom would undercut the intended relationship. Although it
might seem bizarre compared to DADT, where asking and telling norms both
work toward bottling up information, important aspects of personal
relationships are supposed to be governed by DAMT, where asking is inhibited
while telling is obligatory.
1.

PersonalRelationships

Consider infidelity. Ideally, a person should not ask his or her spouse or
romantic partner, "Are you cheating on me?"-just as a flat accusation is
ordinarily inappropriate. But according to mainstream American morality, such
partners should disclose an affair if it happens. 4 7 The question is almost
unavoidably accusatory or, at minimum, conveys suspicion in a way that
undercuts trust. A question can show suspicion as strongly as any

146. For instance, genetic information seems to call for special consideration. Wide
accessibility to genetic testing might be too recent for any reliable social norms to have developed, and
it is possible that too few employees will obtain such information about themselves for the unraveling
dynamic to happen. But a Don't Ask norm might be defended, as it can be in other circumstances, as a
way of protecting employees from nominal questions that are more like troubling commands.
147. Many personal relationships are not mainstream or conventional in the way described in
the text. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277 (2004). Some relationships are romantically or
sexually more open, and some people within those relationships may prefer Don't Ask, Don't Tell or
May Ask, May Tell or something else. See id. at 327-28 (quoting Marny Hall, Turning Down the
Jezebel Decibels, in THE LESBIAN POLYAMORY READER: OPEN RELATIONSHIPS, NON-MONOGAMY,

CASUAL SEX 47, 54-55 (Marcia Munson & Judith P. Stelboum eds., 1999) (describing a couple's
informational logs of their encounters, made available for optional perusal by the other partner)).
AND
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declaration. 4 8 At the same time, marriage and other personal relationships
often depend on a commitment to monogamy, along with a supplemental
commitment to disclose conduct that violates such underlying commitments. If
the parties to the relationship can trust each other to disclose such misconduct
to each other, then they can avoid the discomforting and even destructive
effects of questions that are loaded with suspicion. 149
In fact, evidence indicates that DAMT might save relationships. When a
breach of trust occurs among dating couples, one study shows that the romantic
relationship is roughly twice as likely to be repaired if the cheating partner
discloses voluntarily rather than waiting to be confronted with questions from
the suspicious partner.15 0 The voluntary disclosure by the cheating partner
contains the disclosure rather than airing it publicly, demonstrates the cheating
partner's remorse and perhaps interest in reconciliation, and evinces limits to
the cheater's willingness to deceive the partner. All of these factors made
forgiveness and continuation of the relationship more likely.
To be sure, we
do not know how much of this correlation between disclosure mechanisms and
relationship survival is causal, we cannot be sure whether relationship survival
is a good thing in these contexts, and if the likelihood of eventual detection is
152
low enough, a cheating partner may still elect not to disclose.
But voluntary
disclosure is both morally justified (because it is something the unaware
partner usually would want to know and in the case of a conventional marriage
has a right to know) and likely furthers the interests of a cheating partner who
hopes for reconciliation.

148. Although asking suspicious questions might not do much good toward getting the truth,
the questions seem to up the stakes for misbehaving partners. Lying or deception would be added to
infidelity and nondisclosure. In this sense, these questions indicate a relationship at risk but not yet
dissolved. Note that adultery was and still is a fault-based reason for divorce, and is still a crime in
approximately half the states. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 5.02 cmt. e
(2002); Adultery in New England: Love Free or Die, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2014, at 80. A false
accusation of adultery might give rise to a defamation per se claim but surely tort law is no influence
on questioning as opposed to outright accusing partners regarding adultery.
149. While we regard DAMT as the aspirational social norm governing infidelity, see Ryan B.
Seedall et al., Disclosing Extra-Dyadic Involvement (EDI): Understanding Attitudes, Subjective
Norms, and Perceived Behavioral Control, 35 CONTEMP. FAM. THERAPY 745, 754 fig. 1 (2013)

(finding very strong beliefs among research subjects in the moral obligation to disclose cheating to a
partner); cf Mark H. Butler et al., FacilitatedDisclosure Versus ClinicalAccommodation oflnfidelity
Secrets: An Early Pivot Point in Couple Therapy, 35 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 125, 137-42

(2009) (discussing the morality and consequences of nondisclosure), it could be that non-adherence to
this norm is quite prevalent.
150. See Walid A. Afifi et al., Identity Concerns Followinga Severe Relational Transgression:
The Role of Discovery Aethod for the Relational Outcomes of Infidelity, 18 J. SOC. & PERS.
RELATIONSHIPS 291, 300 (2001) ("[U]nsolicited partner disclosure again produced the least damaging
relational results (43.5% dissolution rate following discovery).... [D]iscovering the infidelity through
solicited information-seeking (86%) or by walking in on the infidelity (83%) .. . were most likely to
lead to relationship dissolution.").
151. See id. at 295, 301-05.
152. See id. at 305.
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Affairs are a fairly narrow illustration, but DAMT probably covers a
sizeable chunk of our social lives. Theoretically, you could always ask a
spouse, partner, friend, or roommate if they took whatever you cannot find at
the moment, but nobody goes that far. At least when the implied accusation is
untrue or the suspicion off-base, these questions may provoke resentment,
wasteful efforts to appear "beyond reproach" in the first place, or emotional
distance and ultimately separation-the opposite of what trust relationships
aspire to. In fact, a Must Tell norm could boost the inference of accusation
from questions about misbehavior. If spouses A and B both know that
misconduct is supposed to be spontaneously disclosed, then spouse A's
question about misconduct communicates suspicion about both underlying
misconduct and the failure to disclose that misconduct. Believing that we are in
a DAMT situation can increase sensitivity and raise stakes, while also helping
bind people together.
DAMT also occurs outside of intimate personal relationships, although in
less clear forms. One example is Catholic confession. To reconcile with God
after the commission of sin, church members must confess to a priest. But it
seems that priests are not in the habit of investigating parishioners or asking
them point-blank about sinful behavior outside of the confession context. The
sinner must periodically initiate the confession procedure to obtain the
sacrament and square up with God, which is optional only in the sense that a
baptized person could choose to go without confession and risk damnation. 153
The Catholic Church's position that the sacrament requires confession to a
church-employed specialist and not a layperson (or directly to God) was one
objection that spurred the Reformation.
But putting aside that controversy,
we can see this sort of DAMT combination in the religious confession practices
of non-Catholics as well as the nonreligious confessions of many other
people.

15

Even if secular, confession to a friend can be an emotional relief and

perhaps even part of a mutual obligation to share secrets. On the other hand,
friends should be shy to fish for revelations of misbehavior, unless honestly
thought to be in the best interest of their counterpart. The fit with DAMT is not
perfect, but these extensions show trust relationships with channels for
disclosure of misconduct without prying questions.

153.

See 4 CODEXIURIS CANONICI c.960 (1983).
See LADISLAS M. ORSY, THE EVOLVING CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE
(1978) (discussing change from a public confession to reenter the community, available for only some
sins, and available only once in a lifetime, to private confessions with a priest repeatedly). Some
economists of religion suggest that the practice involves rent seeking or other risks, while others may
note that priests are specialists who deliver individualized service and that the practice may have
evolved in response to changing demand and circumstances. Compare Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. et al., An
Economic Analysis of the ProtestantReformation, 110 J. POL. ECON. 646, 653-55 (2002), with Benito
Arruflada, Specializationand Rent Seeking in Moral Enforcement: The Case of Confession, 48 J. SCI.
STUDY RELIGION 443, 447-48 (2009).
155. See Arruflada, supra note 154, at 446 (describing confession as a near-universal practice
across history).
154.
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However prevalent, DAMT seems fragile. DAMT norms can be skirted or
flouted, sometimes with serious consequences. On the asking side, accusatory
questions can be replaced with softer inquiries such as, "Hey, where were you
last night?" 5' 6 These substitutes erode the Don't Ask category in practice, and
may put pressure to be accusatory on the initial target of suspicion-as in,
"Why do you ask?" More significantly, the Must Tell part of DAMT is much
harder to police than the Don't Ask part. 5 7 The duty to tell is conditional on
misconduct by B that A, by hypothesis, does not know about. Whether spouse A
has posed an accusatory question to spouse B will basically always be apparent
to spouse B, but whether spouse B is failing to disclose an affair may not be
apparent to spouse A. Furthermore, the class of people benefiting from Don't
Ask norms might be relatively powerful and have an interest in ignoring the
Must Tell norms, or falsely advertising their strength. 158 DAMT under those
conditions can be a scam to maintain cover for infidelity. The DAMT
combination needs a mechanism for incentivizing compliance or matching up
people who have internalized these commitments already. 159 Even when
DAMT is effectively implemented, a Don't Ask norm may interfere with one
person's communication of honest concern to another, and so DAMT usually
comes with costs and important risks.
None of this means that DAMT is irrational or impossible. The
combination seems relatively widespread in intimate relationships. Moreover,
the fragility of DAMT might help people value the relationship highly when
the combination seems to be working, perhaps because success is elusive and
failure is emotionally serious. But fragility and high stakes are not strong
recommendations for DAMT as a generally applicable combination of norms.
2.

Workplace Regulations

Perhaps because of this fragility, law is different from social norms.
DAMT is difficult to identify anywhere in law and, when DAMT legal norms
do emerge, they might be a mistake or a regrettable side effect of regulation.

156. Cf supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing the tear-jerker speech in Innis).
157. Cf BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 95 (suggesting that mandatory disclosure rules might
not be effective); DEBORAH M. ANAPOL, POLYAMORY: THE NEW LOvE WITHOUT LIMITS: SECRETS
OF SUSTAINABLE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 3 (1997) ("Lies, deceit, guilt, unilateral decisions and
broken commitments are so commonplace in classic American-style monogamy that responsible
nonmonogamy may sound like an oxymoron.").
158. Cf Russell K. Robinson, StructuralDimensions ofRomantic Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2787, 2787 (2008) ("Because race and gender intersect to determine an individual's value in the
romantic marketplace, the two partners are unlikely to be similarly situated in terms of their options for
leaving the relationship should it become unhappy.").
159. Among the possibilities are attempting to signal Must Tell commitments (perhaps by
disclosing other misconduct that clearly would not have been detected), or adjusting the expected
severity of social sanctions depending on whether the misconduct was voluntarily disclosed before
detection or suspicion. There seems to be no perfect solution, but we expect people to make efforts to
make DAMT work given its apparent value.
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Consider employment law. Employer questions are only occasionally
prohibited by law, but the Americans with Disabilities Act is a partial
exception. 1o The statute instructs employers to not "make inquiries of an
employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as
to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such . .. inquiry is shown to be
job-related and consistent with business necessity."'61 The statute thus demands
a job-related justification for such questions without flatly prohibiting them.162
Employers can still get into trouble for asking questions, however. In Roe v.
Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort,163 a district court held that an
employer could not ask employees to disclose the legal prescription
medications that they use, unless the employer could show a relationship to the
job and business necessity.164 Looking slightly beyond formal law, we can see
a significant Don't Ask norm at work. Regulated employers will not always be
able to discern the legal difference between asking about a disability as
opposed to a permissible topic, or between asking an economically justified
question as opposed to an impermissible question. 16 Again, concerns about
litigation risk can prompt employers to avoid questions arguably related to
166
certain employee traits, not to mention social norms in favor of silence.

160.

See Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between

a Rock and a HardPlace, 14HOFSTRALAB.L.J. 365, 381-86 (1997).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012); see also id. § 12112(d)(2) (covering job applicants,
and clarifying that "[a] covered entity may make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an
applicant to perform job-related functions").
162. The statute separately allows drug testing. See id. § 12112(d)(1), (2); see also EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: DISABILITY RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF
EMPLOYEES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABLITIES ACT (ADA) § B.2 (July 27, 2000) (noting

that "tests to determine the current illegal use of drugs" are "generally are not considered medical
examinations"), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html; id. § B.8
(recognizing circumstances where it is permissible to require employees in positions affecting public
safety to report taking medication).
163.

920 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Colo. 1996).

164. See id. at 1154-55.
165. Complicating matters, there is equivocal authority for the proposition that an employer
may actually have a duty to investigate the possibility of making accommodations for an employee
with a disability, once the disability seems obvious. See Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127,
135 (2d Cir. 2008) (Calabresi, J.); see also Barnettv. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). But
cf Mole v. Buckhorn Rubber Prods., Inc., 165 F.3d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating that an
employee cannot "expect the employer to read [her] mind" about desired and needed
accommodations) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). This would amount to
AMJust Ask, May Tell for disability law under certain conditions. See supra Fig. 1. Another wrinkle
involves what employers should tell employees about accommodations granted to coworkers, but we
set aside this issue.
166. Some protected traits are transparent to observers, and so employer questions about them
seem unnecessary, a legal prohibition bootless (if the goal is reinforcing anti-use norms), and
employee disclosure irrelevant or gratuitous. Few employers need to ask about an employee's race to
know what it is, in a socially constructed sense. But for more opaque employee traits-such as
religion, national origin, sexual orientation, family status, pregnancy, genetic information, and certain
types of disability posing questions might yield new information.
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Identifying Must Tell rules for employees is more difficult. Employees
rarely have a legal duty to disclose information concerning traits that
employers should not (or will not) ask about. 6 7 A possible exception involves
workplace hazards. There, tort law might overlap with employment
discrimination law. Employees with certain disabilities can present increased
risks to others if their conditions are not disclosed and adjusted for. An
employee with a communicable disease might be perfectly capable of
performing many job duties effectively, efficiently, and safely, if precautions
are taken to reduce the risk of infection to a given level. Indeed, those
precautions might be necessary for the employee to comply with ordinary tort
duties, including the duty to warn others of known risks. 6 8 An employer might
not take adequate precautions (e.g., by requiring safety gloves or masks) unless
the disease is disclosed. At the same time, the employer might be deterred from
asking about either employee diseases or employee need for disability-based
accommodations because of a perceived litigation risk.
Strictly speaking, even this workplace hazard scenario might not fit the
DAMT combination. The Must Tell rule is derived from the application of
general tort duties, while the Don't Ask rule is partially an unintended side
effect of litigation risks in discrimination law. So this "example" of DAMT
looks more like an unintended consequence than an intelligently designed
combination in law. That said, DAMT could have a plausible defense in this
workplace context even if it does not arise by design. More than one regulatory
goal is in play. The Don't Ask rule might serve an anti-coercion mission that
justifiably constrains employers, whether or not over-deterrence occurs, while
the Must Tell rule might represent an exceptional yet justifiable regulation
directed at employees to prevent public harm while avoiding employer
browbeating. Note that these justifications do not involve building a delicate
trust relationship between employers and employees, but perhaps the
confluence of rules and incentives with different goals is roughly tolerable.
A similar DAMT candidate stems from Tarasoff duties.169 A majority of
states require a therapist to warn others or the authorities if the therapist

167. Here we are contrasting legal duties to disclose from legal benefits conditioned on
disclosure for instance, a disabled person might have to inform others to recover in tort, see Vaughn
v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Minn. 1997), or to receive employment accommodations,
see Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001), not to mention social security
disability payments.
168. Cf Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1391, 1395-96 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (addressing
AIDS and sexual partners); Franklinv. Butcher, 129 S.W. 428, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (addressing
smallpox transmission from a stranger to a child); Rebecca Bennett et al., IgnoranceIs Bliss? HIV and
Aoral Duties and Legal Duties to Forewarn, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 9 (2000); Timothy J. Hasken, Note, A
Duty to Kiss and Tell?: Examining the Uncomfortable Relationship Between Negligence and the
Transmission of HPV, 95 IOWA L. REV. 985, 987-92 (2010) (discussing case law on duty to warn
about infectious diseases, especially sexually transmitted diseases).
169. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1976), superseded by
statute CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2013).
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believes that his or her patient is likely to attack somebody.17 0 On the Don't
Ask side, state law might functionally deter potential victims from asking
therapists about what their patients are saying in therapy-to the extent that
potential victims wonder about tort law implications. Perhaps the questioner
could be sued for inducing breach of confidentiality duties,171 which might
yield a defensible balance of pressures on therapists to respect patient
confidences in nearly all situations. That said, we know of no actual case
dealing with questions from people fearful of assault. Revealingly, an element
of the inducement claim in Massachusetts, for example, is that "the defendant
did not reasonably believe that the physician could disclose that information to
the defendant without violating the duty of confidentiality."172 This seems hard
to establish where a person who honestly fears physical attack by a patient asks
a therapist about the risk. 173 Logically, there can be no inducement liability for
asking about a threat that a therapist must or even may disclose to you. Any
residual DAMT combination is more like another side effect of unavoidable
incentives than a plan by judges or legislatures, whatever the merits of the
resulting rules.174

Why might DAMT be familiar in personal relationships but nearly
unknown to formal law? Setting aside workplace hazards and Tarasoffduties,
which involve odd confluences of different regulatory goals, perhaps
formalizing DAMT tends to thwart its more typical trust-based objective. Even
people in intimate personal relationships do not necessarily announce DAMT
as their rule. It strikes us as unlikely that many spouses, couples, or friends
announce to each other that they will not ask about certain transgressions but
promise to tell about them if they happen. Announcing the norms easily could
communicate a troubling obtuseness about the key attributes of such personal
relationships. Similarly, DAMT laws could undermine the trust or reciprocity
170.

See Mental Health Professionals' Duty to Protect/Warn, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
(Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty
-to-warn.aspx. Seventeen states have rules permitting therapists to warn third parties of such dangers.
Id. We would characterize these jurisdictions as May Tell.
171. See Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Mass. 1985) (recognizing an inducement
claim even without threats or promises of reward, where a minister's superiors asked his psychiatrist
about his mental health).
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173.
Cf id. at 119 n.4 (explaining that "[d]isclosure is permitted only to meet a serious danger
to the patient or to others"); Valente v. Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., 2010 WL 5239186, at
*2 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. Dec. 16, 2010) (stressing that the defendant sought information to defend
against a lawsuit, not cash in on new clients).
174. Another offbeat illustration might come from Massachusetts, where the confluence of two
insurance regulations apparently generated a DAMT combination in 2011. The legislature prohibited
insurers, including life insurers, from asking applicants about genetic tests. On the other hand,
actuarially sound genetic tests were supposed to be disclosed by applicants for life insurance. As far as
we know, this combination was not a conscious policy choice. See Turna Ray, GeneticBill ofRights in
Alass. Seeks to Extend Protectionsin Life, Auto, Long-Term Care Insurance, PHARMACOGENOMICS
REPORTER (Feb. 16, 2011), available at https://www.genomeweb.com/dxpgx/genetic-bill-rights
-mass-seeks-extend-protections-life-auto-long-tern-care-insur.
LEGISLATURES
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on which the underlying relationship depends. True, law conceivably can be
understood as a distant third party's announcement that, if people decide to
enter into a particular relationship, then DAMT is a norm that might be
enforced by others. But perhaps even third-party announcements are
excessively formal. In addition, maybe the relationships in need of DAMT
depend on a thoroughgoing voluntariness that is crowded out by a legal normeven if the Must Tell part of the combination is difficult for couples to enforce
on their own. If the parties to a relationship think that law is part of the reason
for following DAMT, the relationship might be poisoned by the confounding
third-party pressures. There is no gift if law orders a person to give. Nor is
reciprocity likely to be induced if the trust generated is not sourced in that
person's emotional commitment, but instead in third-party pressure. 7 5 We
might say that love comes from the heart, not the courts. Court is where divorce
happens. 176
C. Must Ask, Must Tell (MAMT)
Like its polar opposite, MAMT introduces a good measure of redundancy
into the law. DADT regards the disclosure of information as a vice, and
MAMT wrings its hands over the possibility of nondisclosure. This concern
helps explain why restricted markets such as guns, alcohol, and tobacco are
often governed by an MAMT regime at the point of sale. 7 7 This legal regime
applies to countless transactions every day, though many people violate these
laws for personal satisfaction and economic gain. In some locations, perhaps

175. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 76-77 (2003).
176. One last possibility for DAMT in legal institutions involves government employment.
High-level officials might want to select for trustworthy employees who will confess wrongdoing
without the trouble of interrogation, which can threaten trust. We can imagine an intelligence agency
attempting to operate this way, to the extent that tying the hands of interrogators is especially valuable
in attracting and retaining motivated operatives while the agency might detect wrongdoing anyway
using Ask C options. Unfortunately, we have not confirmed such an arrangement, which needs an
effective selection mechanism, and Must Ask or May Ask norms could easily be better for high-level
officials. We thank John Ferejohn for proposing this possibility.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 90, 100. On firearms sales, see Abramski v. United
States, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 2263-64 (2014) (noting required submission of data to the National Instant
Background Check System). On cigarettes, see 21 C.F.R. § 1140.14(b) (2014) (requiring that cigarette
retailers verify by photo I.D. that purchasers are at least age eighteen, unless the purchaser is actually
over twenty-six). On alcohol, see, for example, 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-20 (2014); IND. CODE § 7.15-10-23 (2015). Even when state law does not require alcohol retailers to check I.D.s, retailers often do
so to minimize the risk of legal penalty for violating the Must Use rule. See N.Y. STATE LIQUOR
AUTH., HANDBOOK FOR RETAIL LICENSEES 20-21 (2013) (warning retailers about undercover agents
and "strongly recommend[ing]" card checks, but acknowledging that state law does not require them).
Indeed, even those who come up with plausible-sounding excuses for failing to ask for identification
from those seeking access to alcohol are likely to receive an unsympathetic hearing in court. See, e.g.,
Lubavitch-Chabad of Ill., Inc. v. Nw. Univ., 772 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting
discrimination argument by an Orthodox rabbi who insisted that demanding identification from
students before serving them wine on Jewish holidays would violate the tenets of his religion).
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standard operating procedure is to flout such laws. But imperfect enforcement
does not undercut the straightforward policy defense of MAMT in these
settings. Here law tries to push both askers and tellers in the same direction,
toward the revelation and use of certain information. That individual
preferences and even social norms might conflict with a legal mandate can
indicate the need for law to serve societal or third-party interests. Access to
addictive drugs and dangerous weapons might fit this profile, whatever policy
debates people have at the margins. Another MAMT law affecting millions of
people involves the 1-9 form to verify eligibility to work in the United States.178
Again the law here is only partially effective, and people can debate the extent
to which immigration law should protect certain labor-market participants from
competition with outsiders whom employers would otherwise happily hire. But
taking this part of immigration law as given, MAMT is no surprise and can be
readily defended in light of contrary market incentives.
Yet MAMT's redundancy may be surprising in other contexts. As we
shall see, MAMT sometimes is employed where the asking party either already
has the pertinent information or can obtain it from a third party, and where
there are reasons to be skeptical about the telling party's incentives to answer
the questions forthrightly.
1.

Background Checks

Background checks provide a notable example of MAMT. In 2011, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of subjecting longtime workers
at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to compulsory background
checks.1 79 JPL employees who refused to comply would lose their jobs. 8 0 As
part of the background check, the landlords of JPL's workers would be
required to fill out Form 42-an Investigative Request for Personal
Infonnation.
Form 42 digs into a landlord's assessment of a present or
former tenant's character. As the Court described the document:
After several preliminary questions about the extent of the reference's
associations with the employee, the form asks if the reference has "any
reason to question" the employee's "honesty or trustworthiness." It

178.

See 1-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES,

http://www.uscis.gov/i-9 (last updated May 8, 2013); see also Verification of Identity and
Employment Authorization, 8 C.F.R. 274a.2 (2015).
179. See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011).
180. See id. at 140.
181. Form 42 initially "ask[s]" respondents to "complete all items on the back of this form," but
the fine print of the form suggests that respondents are "required to respond" to a Form 42 that
contains a valid OBM number. U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., INVESTIGATIVE REQUEST FOR

PERSONAL
INFORMATION,
INV
FORM
42
(revised
June
2005),
available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?documentlD=231560&version=1. The Office
of Personnel Management estimates that 1,636,379 copies of Form 42 are sent out every year,
resulting in 111,794 hours of paperwork annually. See U.S. Off. of Personnel Mgmt., Submission for
Renewal, 79 Fed. Reg. 4762, 4763 (Jan. 29, 2014).
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also asks if the reference knows of any "adverse information"
concerning the employee's "violations of the law," "financial
integrity," "abuse of alcohol and/or drugs," "mental or emotional
stability," "general behavior or conduct," or "other matters." If "yes" is
checked for any of these categories, the form calls for an explanation
in the space below. That space is available for providing "additional
information" ("derogatory" or "positive") that may bear on "suitability
for government employment or a security clearance."18 2
The Ninth Circuit found the open-ended questions on Form 42 ("any reason to
question") particularly troubling. 83 That court ruled that this unbounded
question was likely unconstitutional, observing that Form 42 "invites the
recipient to reveal any negative information of which he or she is aware. It is
difficult to see how the vague solicitation of derogatory information concerning
the applicant's 'general behavior or conduct' . . . could be narrowly tailored to

meet any legitimate need." 8 4
The Supreme Court was unimpressed. The alternative to asking landlords
whether they knew anything negative about tenants that might affect their
fitness for federal positions was to produce a much longer form that would
"catalog all the reasons why a person might not be suitable for a particular
job." 8 5 That could be an obnoxious and time-consuming burden if the
landlords were conscientious about responding. As the Court noted, "references
do not have all day."'8 6
On the telling side, the government mandate here addresses two kinds of
respondents who may prefer to remain silent without special legal pressure.
The first type is positively disposed towards the subject of the inquiry and
would prefer not to disclose something that might cause the subject to lose a
job opportunity. But faced with even a remote prospect of a penalty for failure
to answer a question truthfully, the landlord will disclose adverse information
to the government.
The second type is negatively or neutrally disposed
towards the subject and would prefer to disclose the adverse information to the
government in the abstract, but fears defamation or other liability if the
applicant finds out that the landlord contributed to the applicant losing a job
opportunity. Compulsion should prompt the risk-averse landlord to respond,
and the compulsory nature of the landlord's response could make a court

182. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 141-42 (citing Form 42).
183. Nelsonv. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 881 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 562 U.S. 134 (2011).
184. Id.
185. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 154.
186. Id.
187. With respect to this sort of landlord, Form 42's open-ended questions are in one sense less
effective than the alternative of a great many very specific questions. A landlord who knows
something troublesome about a tenant that isn't explicitly addressed on form 42 (say, the job seeker is
an extremely careless driver or an atrocious writer) is unlikely to be penalized in the face of ambiguity
over whether a particular fact provides "any reason to question" an applicant's fitness for a job.
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considering a subsequent defamation suit less sympathetic to the plaintiff. 8 8 In
both instances, Must Tell likely produces more pertinent information than May
Tell. Moreover, the nature of the government's form alerts landlords to a Must
Tell obligation of which they might otherwise be unaware.
2.

Taxes

The personal income tax regime is perhaps the most familiar MAMT
regime to many Americans. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provides each
taxpayer with a form (typically 1040 or 1040-EZ) containing a long list of
questions that the taxpayer must answer truthfully, under penalty of perjury.189
Each taxpayer must answer the same basic questions, though taxpayers with
substantial investment incomes, foreign earnings, or unusual credits and
deductions may need to fill out supplemental forms and schedules.1 90
Strikingly, because the IRS collects tax information from third parties like
employers, banks, and brokerages, it already has much of the most important
information that a taxpayer will provide on the applicable 1040. This
redundancy has sparked reformers to call for replacement of the current, hightransaction-costs MAMT regime with one where the government automatically
calculates each taxpayer's liability (or refund) each year and sends her a bill (or
check).191 Notwithstanding the substantial time savings for taxpayers that such
plans may entail,192 these proposals for reform have not been implemented.
What gives?
Our first answer is that the government might impose Must Ask on itself
to guard against an agency problem. Just as Form 42 limits the ability of a
poorly incentivized government official to perform a careless background
check, Form 1040 similarly forces the government's agents to ask questions
about taxable events that occur quite irregularly but that, in the aggregate, may
make a meaningful contribution to tax revenues. Once the government decides
to ask for information, Must Tell can facilitate automated authentication.
MAMT may be useful in flagging for further review mismatches between the
responses given and the responses expected. Similarly, algorithms can detect
discrepancies between tax information reported by employers and information

188.
Cf Noyes v. Moccia, 1999 WL 814376, at *9 (D.N.H. June 24, 1999) ("In addition,
Defendant Moccia's allegedly defamatory statements were not unsolicited, but were made in response
to the [United States Postal Service's] approved request for information.").
189. See, e.g., United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1206 (D. Utah 2012).
190. For the lengthy list of forms in all its bureaucratic glory, see IRS Accessible Forms,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Accessible-PDF-Forms.
191. See Joseph Bankman, Using Technology to Simplify Individual Tax Filing, 61 NAT'L TAX
J. 773 (2008) (proposing tax data retrieval from IRS and optional automatic tax returns); see also
Randall Stross, Why Can'tthe I.R.S. Help Fill in the Blanks?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, at BU4.
192. At the turn of the millennium, 125.9 million American individual income taxpayers
devoted an estimated 3.21 billion hours to complying with the income tax. See John L. Guyton et al.,
Estimating the Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 56 NAT'L TAX J. 673, 682 (2003).
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reported by employees.193 In a world where the IRS has limited resources,
focusing on these discrepancies is a sensible strategy to detect mistakes and
cheating.
Less obviously, when the government requests personal information from
individuals, rather than obtaining the same information from third parties, it
can prompt self-examination by the individual. Perhaps a world without
mandatory background checks is one in which too many applicants fail to selfscreen, by not asking themselves the hard questions about whether they can be
trusted with state secrets. Maybe for every Edward Snowdenl94 there are
dozens of unknown federal job applicants who realize upon answering
background check questions that they ought not be trusted with a public sector
position and withdraw from consideration. Similarly, we expect that some
taxpayers who prepare their own returns are surprised in April when in
response to a governmental query they write down particular numbers on their
1040 forms. Somewhat dated studies of income tax awareness indicate that
Americans surveyed a few months after filing their taxes were typically 14-19
percent off in estimating the taxes they recently paid, 195 with a slight tendency
to underestimate their tax bills.1 96 If people are bad at estimating their tax
liabilities when they have already calculated their taxes, they might be
particularly inept at assessing such liabilities if they had never calculated their
taxes. Insofar as Americans do the work of calculating their own incomes and
taxes due, it might make them more aware of the burdens of citizenship, better
informed voters, or even instilled with a sense of civic duty that alters their
perceptions of the burden.1 97 People may also be imperfect at assessing their
own incomes,198 so discerning their Adjusted Gross Incomes every year may
prompt individual taxpayers to take actions that better reflect their values (e.g.,
"I should donate more to charity," or "I need to get out of this dead-end job," or
"Why didn't I save more money this year?").
The above are public-spirited justifications for MAMT. But, as with
DADT and DAMT, there are more troubling explanations for this combination.

193. See Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global
Standards on PreventingMoney Laundering and Terrorism Financing,21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
503, 558 (2011).
194. Keep in mind that there is only one Edward Snowden. Or maybe two, if you consider
Chelsea (nee Bradley) Manning to be another Edward Snowden.
195. See Norbert Lloyd Enrick, A PilotStudy of Income Tax Consciousness, 16 NAT'L TAX J.
169, 170 (1963).
196. See id. A more recent literature review on tax perceptions is Martin Fochmann et al., Tax
Perception:

An

Empirical

Survey,

ARQUS-DISKUSSIONBEITRAGE

ZUR

QUANTITATIVEN

STEUERLEHRE, No. 99 (2010).
197.
Some of these arguments are considered in LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE
FORM 1040 ch. 1 (2013).
198. See generally Marcel Das & Arthur van Soest, Expected and Realized Income Changes:
Evidence from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, 32 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 137, 146-51 (1997)
(suggesting that demographic groups of Dutch respondents varied in their tendencies to overestimate
or underestimate their current year income, but that underestimation was more common in total).
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With respect to income tax filing, supporters of small government might
believe that "the process is the punishment," to borrow a phrase. Filling out a
1040 is, for millions of people, worse than a waste of time. It is an occasion for
frustration and even outrage at the federal government's greed. Advocates who
want a night-watchman-style small state might believe that individuals will not
feel such frustration and outrage if the government lightens the paperwork
burden. Tax preparers form an important interest group, too, and they may
resist efforts to streamline the government's questioning.
D. Must Ask, Don't Tell (MA4DT)
"If any of you can show just cause why they may not lawfully be married,
speak now; or else for ever hold your peace" is a request that has been made for
generations at countless traditional Christian wedding ceremonies.1 99 Although
the quoted language might be rarely employed these days, it still figures
prominently in films, with directors apparently unable to resist the ostensibly
hilarious contrast between what the guests or filmgoers are thinking (skeletons
in the closet, a doomed relationship) and external appearances (a match made
in heaven, till death do they part). Or sometimes the guests in the film do not
hold their peace, and a doomed nuptial is avoided.200 Audiences respond well
to these scenes because they know that, in fact, it would be deeply
inappropriate to voice objections at somebody else's wedding regardless of the
literal meaning of a minister's invitation. The social norm against telling at
these ceremonies, in front of everybody assembled, is strong enough to
dissuade guests from interpreting the ceremonial words as anything like an
honest request for information. The entrenched MADT norm functions in a
manner somewhat similar to a penalty default;201 it incentivizes those with
material information to bring it to the bride and groom's attention long before
the wedding day. Either way, there are recurring situations in which some
people feel encouraged to ask while other people are discouraged from
answering.

199.

THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 424 (Gregory M. Howe ed.,

2007)
(1789),
available
at
http://www.episcopalchurch.org/sites/default/files/downloads/
book-of commonprayer.pdf.
200. The Graduate is the most famous movie scene of this sort. Other depictions include Four
Weddings and a Funeral, Harold & Kumar Escapefrom GuantanamoBay, The Lonely Guy, Made of
Honor (earnestly following the formula), Wayne s World 2, and What About Bob? (parodying the
Graduate formula). For a comprehensive listing, see Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace,
TVTROPES, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/SpeakNowOrForeverHoldYourPeace
(last
visited Apr. 3, 2015).
201. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory ofDefaultRules, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 91 (1989).
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"Meet the Press" and Codes of Silence

Whereas the wedding version of MADT promotes answering the key
question earlier, its journalistic equivalent underscores the desirability of
answering later. When politicians who are thinking of running for President
appear for interviews on news programs, viewers are subjected to an odd form
of MADT. The interviewer inevitably asks the politician whether she will run,
and the prospective candidate usually offers a coy nonresponse. 202 Journalists
may even preface this line of questioning in a manner that underscores its
obligatory nature, as when John Patterson said to then-Senator Obama, "I'm
pretty sure I know the answer, but I have to ask, because everyone has to ask
this question now: Are you flat-out ruling out a run in 2008?",203 The goal of
204

journalists here seems to be creating artificial drama. The question is usually
asked at a time when declaring one's candidacy is politically inopportune. It is
not as though candidates who have decided to run for higher office ever forget
to announce their candidacies.
Sometimes, however, the candidate actually says that he is indeed
running, jolting viewers who were expecting to encounter the Sunday morning
punditry's peculiar form of kabuki. But this tends to occur with severe
205
underdogs, especially those who have run and lost before.
For these
candidates, a Q&A session on a national television program is about as much
attention as they are ever going to get. As a result, the candidate who actually
announces his or her candidacy for the Presidency on Good Morning America
or Meet the Press is likely to be giving a concession speech on the night of the
New Hampshire primaries.

202. See, e.g., Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Feb. 18, 2007), available at 2007
WLNR 3242832 (Chuck Hagel refusing to answer Tim Russert's questions about whether he will seek
the Republican nomination for President in 2008); Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Feb. 11,
2007), available at 2007 WLNR 2723485 (recounting various exchanges between Tim Russert and
Barack Obama about whether the latter would run for President, with initially definitive answers being
replaced by nonresponses as the presidential primaries drew nearer); ABC News Now/Special Reports
(ABC television broadcast Dec. 10, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 24493409 (Sarah Palin refusing
to answer Barbara Walter's question about whether she will seek the presidency in 2012). This routine
is a specific example of a more general relationship between politicians and the professional news
media, part of which involves apparently adversarial Q&A.
203. John Patterson, What's Changedfor Obama in Last 2 Years, DALY HERALD (Chi.), July
27, 2006, at 7, available at 2006 WLNR 24379014. To this query, the future President responded, I
was asked the day after the election to the Senate, when I was running for president. I said at that time
I was not running for president. Nothing has changed my mind." Id.
204. Judicial confirmation hearings in the Senate sometimes follow the same formula, with
Senators asking questions they know the nominees will not answer about how the nominees would
rule in particular cases.
205. See, e.g., GoodAorningAmerica (ABC television broadcast May 13, 2011), available at
2011 WLNR 9594998 (in which Ron Paul responds to George Stephanopoulos that he will in fact seek
the Presidency in 2012); Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast February 24, 2008), available at
2008 WLNR 3637693 (in which Ralph Nader responds to Tim Russert that he will be running for
President again).
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As these twin examples suggest, Must Ask, Don't Tell is a strange
combination that we should not expect or want in many areas. MADT suggests
a malfunction in our social systems, in which a group of questioners are
obligated to demand information that a group of respondents are obligated to
withhold. A number of interactive situations produce MADT combinations that
are more or less tragic, even if fairly stable over time. Think about "codes of
silence" among police officers who are committed to impeding misconduct
206
investigations by internal affairs and others up the chain of command.
And
think about "don't snitch" campaigns among those in the game of organized
crime, as well as ordinary citizens, who are committed to impeding criminal
207
investigations by police officers.
In these settings of outright conflict,
competing subgroups have developed competing sets of norms. To see the
MADT combination, an observer must open the frame of reference to
aggregate two different lines of authorities. Code-of-silence situations are not
far from spy-versus-spy international intrigue, which is unavoidable to a degree
but hardly comforting. Nor are they terribly far from the relationship between
investigative journalists seeking classified information and government
officials sometimes resisting and sometimes disclosing.
As we have seen, U.S. law does not often embrace Don't Ask, Must Tell,
either. But in that case, our best explanation involves law's difficulty in
building the delicate trust relationships on which DAMT is often based. With
MADT, law might be all too effective in signaling the absence of trust and the
acceptability of open conflict. Of course, any market economy of significant
scale will encompass significant differences in values, worldviews, and
strategies. Some conflict and competition are unavoidable, and they can be
sources of growth and innovation if regulated intelligently. This does not mean
law ought to loudly endorse questions calling for information that should not be
disclosed, but it does suggest that law and social norms will tolerate MADT in
some situations. So we might look for MADT combinations where adversarial
relationships are tolerated and where asymmetries in information and wit are
accepted. Which brings us to lawyering.
2.

Civil Discovery

Civil discovery in the United States sometimes entails voluminous
requests for information and voluminous responses to those requests. In
complex cases, where millions of (electronic) documents might change hands,
lawyers frequently make mistakes, improperly producing attorney work

206.
7 (2002).

See Jerome H. Skolnick, Corruption and the Blue Code ofSilence, 3 POLICE PRAC. & RES.

207.
See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE 121-38 (2009) (asserting that "don't snitch" norms originated with people

actively involved in the drug trade and drew complaints from citizens and affected neighborhoods who
objected to informants staying on the streets, but acknowledging more widespread campaigns).
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product or privileged communications when those documents should have been
withheld in accord with the client's interest. In some jurisdictions it is fair to
characterize law's attitude toward the civil discovery of privileged documents
in high-stakes cases as MADT.208 Not all discovery rules have this character,
obviously. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) creates a limited norm of
"must tell even if not asked": parties are supposed to disclose automatically to
each other certain information that is helpful, not harmful, to the disclosing
209
party's case.
More important, judicial personnel help manage civil discovery
under a general rule that parties must answer each other's relevant questions.
The discovery rules are, however, adversarial in key respects. Along with rules
of professional responsibility and lawyers' economic incentives, if not the
social-sanction-backed norms of our profession, the civil discovery system
210
often encourages adversarial MAMT behavior.
From the perspective of the lawyer seeking discovery in a high-stakes
211
case, Must Ask is the order of the day. As an agent of the client,
the attorney
is ethically obligated to seek relevant documents that may help the client
construct a case or learn information relevant to the causes of action, defenses,
and damages at issue.212 Lawyers are not, however, charged with taking any

measures to limit the scope of discovery in a manner that will reduce the risk of
213
privileged documents improperly changing hands.
Rather, the responsibility
for preventing leaks of privileged information is squarely on the shoulders of
opposing counsel. Thus, from the perspective of the lawyer responding to a
discovery request, Don't Tell is the imperative for privileged information and
attorney work product-unless the interests of the principal would be served by
disclosure, of course, in which case the lawyer-agent should recommend not
invoking the privilege. Crudely speaking, each side fights for its own interest.

208.

See Paula Schaefer, Technology s Triple Threat to the Attorney-ClientPrivilege, 2013 J.

PROF. LAW. 171, 178-80. In run-of-the-mill, lower-stakes cases handled by solo practitioners and
small firms, May Ask, Don't Tell and May Ask, May Tell are more likely to prevail.
209. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (referring to certain items that a party "may use to
support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment"); see also id. at
26(e)(1) (requiring updates). The rule is useless insofar as parties already have incentives to disclose
helpful evidence to impress their adversaries and obtain a favorable settlement.
210. Another partial exception is the duty to consider cost to the other side when formulating
discovery requests. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii); see also Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int'l, LLC,
285 F.R.D. 331, 334-38 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (collecting cases imposing cost sharing on requesting
parties).
211. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39, 40-48, 76
(1989) (explaining competing conceptions of the proper lawyer role, though concluding that the
officer-of-the-court conception is a small part of the enforced norms of professional conduct).
212. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY § 1.2-3 (2014).

213. Lawyers might limit the scope of their discovery questions so as to mitigate the fees they
will have to charge clients for reviewing the documents produced, or to comply with their Rule 26(g)
duties. Privileged documents from the other side, though, are likely to be juicy enough that it will
almost inevitably be worth the client's time to review them once they have been produced.
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Of course, lawyers do not always fulfill these roles. Interestingly, legal
authorities differ with respect to what ought to happen when a lawyer seeking
discovery asks, opposing counsel improperly tells, and documents that should
have been part of a privilege log instead find their way into the hands of
opposing counsel. Under ABA Model Rule 4.4(b), an attorney who receives
information that the attorney knows or reasonably should know to be privileged
or work product has a duty to inform the disclosing party of this fact.214 The
improperly disclosing party may then seek a remedy under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B), which may require the return or destruction of
215
inadvertently disclosed privileged or work-product information.
But
disagreement and ambiguity abound. Some jurisdictions have not adopted Rule
216
4.4(b).
Even where the rule applies, determining whether information was
sent inadvertently may be a judgment call, one made by the receiving attorney
217
against the background of his or her duty to help the client.
There is then the
related issue of whether attorney-client confidentiality has been waived for
purposes of trial, and the federal rule is about equally gauzy. In federal
proceedings, the improper disclosure of attorney-client privileged
communications or work product does not constitute a waiver if "(1) the
disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took
reasonable steps to rectify the error."218 Under this approach, the sloppy or
passive lawyer who has unwittingly supplied the adversary with privileged
communications has lost the privilege for the client and is potentially liable for
malpractice, but the test for any of these elements is far from self-executing.
Working in combination, then, the rules provide cause for parties to
include privileged and work-product information within the ambit of their
discovery requests. At minimum the rules offer no reason to take care that the
other side's privileged material stays secret. While most responding parties will
invoke the privilege, some will fail to do so as a result of bad legal judgment or
improper protocols, and this possibility is a payoff for inclusive discovery

214. "Must Ask, Don't Tell, Must Tell"! The resulting 27-box matrix appears in an appendix.
215. For a helpful discussion, see Nathan M. Crystal, Inadvertent Production of Privileged
Information in Discovery in FederalCourt: The Needfor Well-Drafted ClawbackAgreements, 64 S.C.
L. REV. 581, 600-04 (2013).
216. See Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise
ProfessionalConductRules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 205-08 (2010).
217. See id. at 603; see also Schaefer, supra note 208, at 179-80 (asserting that, even in states
with a notification duty, there are "numerous cases in which the sending attorney first learned of the
disclosure not through notice from opposing counsel, but at a deposition where the mistake was
revealed for the first time," and that receiving attorneys might think that disclosure can be so terribly
careless as to be beyond "inadvertence").
218. FED. R. EVID. 502(b). Not all states follow the federal approach in state court litigation.
See Leroy J. Tomquist & Christine R. Olson, Why Oregon Should Adopt an Equivalent to Federal
Rule ofEvidence 502, 46 WLLAMETTEL. REV. 539, 565-68 (2010).
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requests that offer no friendly reminders about privilege risks.219 There is
always hope that a key privileged communication will slip through and be
available as evidence at trial, thereby favorably changing the settlement
dynamics. To be sure, some parties have tried to mitigate the risks of these
sorts of mistakes through claw-back agreements entered into at the beginning
of discovery, but even these claw-back agreements often give rise to thorny
220
new legal disputes.
We might wonder why law imposes minor burdens on the party seeking
discovery only at the time it receives a document that it knows or should know
to be privileged. Why not impose obligations on parties seeking discovery to
frame their requests for documents to mitigate the risk of an inadvertent
disclosure? A good initial response rests on information asymmetries: the party
responding to discovery is the only party that sees all the pertinent documents,
and so is in the best position to prevent these errors. At the time its discovery
requests are formulated, the asking party is essentially flying blind. That said,
while the lawyer producing the discovery is almost always going to be the least
cost avoider, it does not necessarily follow that all of the burdens of avoiding
the accident ought to fall on the producing lawyer. Beyond that, the failure of
the states to coalesce around a unified solution to this costly problem reflects a
clash of conflicting values. States want to clamp down on a kind of litigation
gamesmanship that raises costs and contributes to acrimony, but at the end of
the day judges also prefer having access to information that promotes accurate
fact-finding, and they may benefit from the existence of doctrines that penalize
careless lawyering, too.
E.

PartiallyPermissiveRules

On the one hand, as we noted early on, the purely permissive combination
of May Ask, May Tell often fits the intuition that the individuals with questions
and answers have a better sense of the trade-offs involved than the government
or the community.221 On the other hand, Don't Ask, Don't Tell222 and Must
Ask, Must Tell223 offered reasons for Q&A rules to point in the same direction

sometimes, either inhibiting or encouraging information flows beyond what
unregulated parties might produce on their own. The least intuitive
combinations of Don't Ask, Must Tell224 and Must Ask, Don't Tell225 also

219. Contrast the footer on every email you receive from any lawyer on any topic, plus the long
list of consumer protection disclosure requirements. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOw: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE

(2014).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

For
See
See
See
See
See

discussion, see Crystal, supra note 215, at 603-23.
supratext accompanying notes 46-54.
supraPart II.A.
supraPart1I.C.
supraPart 1I.B.
supraPart II.D.
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occupy interesting locations in our legal and social life, but those spaces are
sometimes small, difficult to defend, and unstable. This leaves one last set of
combinations that deserves comment: partially permissive rules.
Q&A rules sometimes show a targeted regulatory interest, combining a
one-sided permissive rule with a Must or Don't rule. As Figure 1 illustrated,
each form of partially permissive rule exists in American law and society. The
small puzzle of these rules is why legal and social norms would not tilt all the
way toward preventing or requiring both asking and telling, when total
permissiveness is denied. Our analysis above suggests explanations in these
spaces, too: permissive norms often show confidence in the judgment of a
questioner or respondent, but such confidence need not extend to every party
involved. Partially permissive rules might be defended based on asymmetric
226
regulatory risks and opportunities.
Here we will simplify the analysis of this
complicated subject by focusing on legal rules and plausible explanations.
Don't Ask, May Tell examples often are linked to one-sided worries about
the vulnerability of respondents to questioner power. Suspect B might have a
right to remain silent in a custodial environment free from prying questions
from officer A, but B need not continue to exercise that right. As well, an
employer cannot lawfully ask employees whether they support unionization;
227
the query is perceived as one likely to intimidate workers.
Yet preventing
employees from expressing union preferences would impede unionization
deliberations by inhibiting worker-to-employer communication and worker-toworker persuasion. Similar judgments probably are at work when
antidiscrimination law regulates employer questions about religion, disability,
criminal history, or other traits without regulating employee disclosures about
those traits.228 Such one-sided regulation will sometimes misfire via
229
230
unraveling, as we have discussed,
or via statistical discrimination.
May Ask, Must Tell also can arise from one-sided worries about powerthis time the power of potential respondents. Sometimes a tip-off is the duty to
tell being conditioned on getting a question. Under FOIA, person A gets to
decide whether to be interested in certain government operations, while
government agency B has a legal obligation to respond with certain categories

226. This thought can be connected to regulated markets more generally, as Daryl Levinson has
helpfully suggested to us. Sometimes participants in the same market for goods and services are
regulated differently with respect to related behavior. Rules of professional responsibility might
prohibit lawyers from chasing ambulances, but injured people are free to chase lawyers. The least cost
avoider might effectively shoulder greater responsibility to prevent injuries than other people with
whom she interacts, and not only by issuing warnings. Some of our commentary here might
generalize, and lessons might be drawn from other markets. Given our focus in this Article, however,
we leave those extensions to another day.
227. See Venture Indus., Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 1133, 1138 (2000).
228. See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: RethinkingRace, Ex-Offender Status, and
Employment Discriminationin the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REv. 893 (2014).
229. See supraPart II.A.2.
230. See, e.g., LIOR JACOB STRAHLEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 142-46 (2011).
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of records upon request.231 The government is acting as an agent of the people.

Furthermore, it is an agent that does not know people's interests before it
receives requests, which also helps explain why telling is conditioned on
232
asking.
(Mandatory reporting statutes for suspected child abuse represent a
distinct concern, by the way. Teachers, clergy, health care professionals, and
child advocates have legal obligations to report suspected abuse to the state, 233
but the state generally does not ask mandatory reporters whether they have
234
learned of any suspected abuse.
Perhaps we can trust the state to assess
whether such queries require too much paperwork or will prompt mandatory
reporters to hound children with questions, which could damage trust
relationships between mandatory reporters and children.235)
Other combinations may reflect concerns about asymmetric information
and administrative convenience, yielding regulation of A or B but not both.
May Ask, Don't Tell pops up when home buyers are permitted to ask their real
estate agents about the racial composition of a neighborhood, but the Fair
Housing Act's anti-steering rules at least arguably prohibit the real estate agent
236
from answering such a question.
Somewhat similarly, home buyers are
See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
232. Revealingly, the government's duty to tell extends only to existing records otherwise
within the scope of the statute. See id; NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1975);
Samaha, supra note 70, at 971-72 (highlighting limits on FOIA). There is no generally applicable
statutory obligation to respond to questions that agency employees could answer with ease, let alone to
use the kind of records covered by FOIA. The statute is a compromise, not a full implementation of a
principal-agent model.
233. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13031 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 2014); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 722.623 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-3
(West 2014); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2014); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (2013). In each
instance, the mandated reporter's duty is limited to reporting based on reasonable cause, and not

231.

extended to a duty to investigate. See also ILL. DEP'T OF CHLDREN & FAMILY SERVS., MANUAL FOR

MANDATED
REPORTERS
(2014),
available
at
http://www.illinois.gov/dcfs/safekids/
reporting/Documents/cfs_1050-21_mandatedreporter manual.pdf.
234. The statutory frameworks establishing mandatory reporting regimes generally contain no
provisions requiring law enforcement officers to survey those subject to mandatory reporting
requirements about whether they have any information that would give rise to a duty to report.
Governmental duties under such statutes are typically limited to training mandatory reporters about
their legal investigations and properly investigating an allegation once it is brought to the state's
attention. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11175 (West 2014).
235. Compare our discussion in Part II.B.1 of the harm that suspicious questions about
infidelity can do to a romantic relationship.
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). Compare Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 n.11
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (suggesting in dicta that responding to such questions could be unlawful), aff d, 547
F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977), with Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1530-31 (7th Cir. 1990)
(suggesting in dicta that responding to such questions is lawful if the conversation is initiated by the
client). For the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's application of § 3604(a) to
racial steering, see 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a) (2014). The legal issue remains highly controversial, see
Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year "FirstStep": The FairHousingAct as an Incomplete Tool
for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1643-46 (2007), but real estate agents' practice
is evidently to resist answering such questions based on concerns about legal liability, see Teke
Wiggin, Steering 2.0? Data May Undermine FairHousing Laws, INMAN SELECT (April 29, 2014),
http://www.inian.com/2014/04/29/steering-2-0-data-may-undermine-fair-housing-laws/.
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permitted to tell real estate agents about their desire to be proximate to a
particular faith's church or temple, but real estate agents should not broach the
issue.237 Here the law, on one reading, seeks to undermine voluntary racial and

religious segregation by inhibiting information flows, and regulating the
conduct of real estate agents will be much cheaper and more effective than
regulating the conduct of unorganized and less-sophisticated customers.
Information asymmetries concerning a contractual nondisclosure obligation can
also yield May Ask, Don't Tell. Here the questioner is ignorant about the
would-be-teller's contractual obligation, so putting the responsibility for
avoiding the disclosure on the shoulders of the party that has assumed the
obligation is both economically sensible and morally appealing.
Finally, partially permissive rules can have paternalistic justifications,
when people believe A or B should be made to help B or A. Thus May Ask,
Don't Tell norms can protect the questioner from information he only thinks he
wants to hear. Legal immunity can arise for physicians who withhold
238
information from patients for therapeutic reasons.
Social norms may dictate
diversionary tactics when friends ask each other whether a haircut is appealing
or whether an unreturnable outfit makes them look fat. Perhaps the
aforementioned sexist norm against asking an adult woman her age had a
similar origin: women would be tempted to lie in response to the question.239
On the other hand, Must Ask, May Tell can encourage B to consider using
information that society values, and yet leave the ultimate decision to her. An
example is police-offered Miranda warnings coupled with a question about the
arrestee's understanding.240 This is a nudge from A that might highlight B's
options. Similarly, May Ask, Must Tell can be a strategy to ensure that A
receives information that she personally does not want. Here, telling duties will
not be conditioned on anyone asking. Several states have enacted laws to
compel abortion providers to disclose information241 and, more recently, to

237. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.70(a), 100.500 (2014).
238. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Stewart A. Laidlaw et al.,
Genetic Testing and Human Subjects in Research, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 462 (2002); Peter H.
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 945 n. 184 (1994) (discussing a privilege
for therapeutic nondisclosure in the United Kingdom).
239. Concern for respondents was a rationale for prohibiting sworn trial testimony from
criminal defendants in early American history. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).
Several reasons have been given, such as the presumably low reliability of the information and
avoiding temptation to perjury and sin. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical
Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2645 & n.77, 2661-62 (1996).
Obviously this regime fell apart.
240. Whether informal pressures will lead a suspect to ignore or waive these rights is another
important issue.
241. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (O'Connor,
Kennedy & Souter, JJ., joint opinion); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1303(d) (2014) (regarding
mandatory disclosures by doctors about fetal heartbeat and the probability of carrying to term); see
also Edwards v. Beck, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1101 (E.D. Ark. 2014) (upholding the Arkansas disclosure
requirements).
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display ultrasound images to women seeking abortions. 242 While North
Carolina requires the patient to sign a form indicating whether she "has availed
herself of the opportunity to view the image" of the fetus,243 the act should not

"be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting her eyes from the
displayed images or from refusing to hear the simultaneous explanation and
medical description."244 The law thus shies away from a Clockwork Orangestyle "May Ask, Must Tell, Must Listen" regime, though it does require the
abortion provider to display and describe the fetus's anatomy even if the patient
245
is plugging her ears and wearing a blindfold.
Such Must Tell duties result from an unusual combination of factors. A
concern for third-party harms (here, to fetuses) is an obvious ground for
defense. Indeed, North Carolina legislators presumably would prefer to prohibit
246
most abortions but are barred by constitutional doctrine from doing so.
Hence they arrive at their second-best solution of mandating disclosure of
information and images designed to dissuade women from obtaining abortions,
which also might be characterized as facilitating informed consent. At the same
time, paternalistic explanations also play a part. At minimum, the state wants
247
the citizenry to reflect on the moral significance of their decision.
More
insidiously, the state might feel that women are particularly susceptible to
emotional manipulation, and that confronting an image of a fetus is especially
248
likely to pull at the heartstrings of women.
In any case, the Fourth Circuit
recently invalidated the Must Tell portion of North Carolina's regime on First
Amendment grounds,249 moving the state toward May Ask, May Tell-where
we began.

242. See Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127
HARV.L.REV. 2392, 2415-21 (2014).
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2)-(5) (2013).
244. Id. § 90-21.85(b).
245. See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602-03 (M.D.N.C. 2014). The law permits
abortion providers to make blindfolds and noise-cancelling headphones available to patients who do
not wish to hear the physician's disclosures, though it does not require that they do so. See id. at 590.
246. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (joint opinion) (endorsing an undue burden test).
247. See Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 605, aff'd sub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246
(4th Cir. 2014) ("The state freely admits that the purpose and anticipated effect of the Display of RealTime View Requirement is to convince women seeking abortions to change their minds or reassess
their decisions.").
248. See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REv. 351, 396-97 (2008) (suggesting this objective and that such an
ultrasound requirement is "less an appeal to reason than an attempt to overpower it").
249. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 252-55. But see Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs.
v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577-80 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding similar regulations against a First
Amendment challenge).
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III.
THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS

By now, we hope that readers are convinced that legal and social norms in
a complex society with diverse relationships should generate every possible
combination of asking and telling norms, though some combinations will
appear more frequently and last longer than others, depending on the
circumstances. In this Part, we provide more structure to our analysis by
suggesting further themes for the patterns we see. One basis for sorting Q&A
norms is whether they are meant to control subsequent use of the queried
information. Sometimes use concerns are the best explanation and justification
for regulating Q&A, sometimes not. We then show how current technological
developments upset some of the traditional strategies for regulating asking and
telling. Though the world we have described so far has been mostly binary,
with A and B deciding whether to exchange information, we will suggest how
the existence of multiple repositories for information both complicates the
analysis and offers new opportunities for policy makers concerned about the
quantum and quality of information flows.
A.

Use Rules

In attempting to organize and rationalize a large number of examples, we
might suggest a number of themes. For instance, we have indicated that many
asking and telling norms are defensible on second- or third-party interests, and
some on paternalistic concerns. Likewise, we might try to understand
combinations of Q&A rules by assuming optimistically that social and legal
norms tend to be efficient or welfare maximizing. Alternatively, one could
assume that social and legal norms cater to the interests of the powerful and the
mainstream. Each of these ideas is useful in developing provisional positive
and normative theories for any legal or social rule, including those governing
the pushing and pulling of information. A more targeted principle for sorting
our examples involves the relationship between information disclosure and
information use. This relationship might prove critical to understanding which
combination of Q&A norms is plausibly best and perhaps why a legal and
social system adopts particular norms.
Two of our extreme asking and telling combinations are readily defended
by use concerns, if only in part. Don't Ask, Don't Tell becomes a plausible
combination of silencing norms when the goal is to prevent the information in
question from influencing decisions. Employment discrimination laws, in
conjunction with various social norms, reinforce commitments to prevent
adverse decisions based on protected traits. The U.S. military's abandoned and
severely compromised DADT policy indicated that policy makers had not
coalesced around a Don't Use norm. By the same token, Must Ask, Must Tell
becomes plausible when the goal is instead to ensure that decisions are based
on the information in question. The most common examples involve restricted
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products and labor markets (in which economic incentives would produce more
deals than policy makers will tolerate), and we analyzed interesting illustrations
involving background checks and income taxes. One might be tempted to
generalize that any combination involving a "Must" or "Don't" indicates
concern about information use.
Many more justifications for regulating Q&A are apparent in our analysis,
however, to say nothing of the constellation of forces responsible for
establishing these norms as a positive matter. Go no further than personal and
contractual duties of confidentiality. The resulting Don't Tell obligations may
not have anything to do with norms against others using the confidential
information, as opposed to encouraging reliance on agreements and generating
safe spaces for honest discussion, for instance. So, too, for Don't Ask rules.
Surely most people do not want law enforcement to use every available
technology and interrogation technique to identify law breaking,250 but this
position on police inquiries does not suggest that the incriminating information
itself should be off-limits in a criminal trial if gathered in an acceptable
manner. Questions can be perfectly appropriate in terms of subject matter yet
objectionably overbearing or coercive, whether in police custody or
employment settings. Gentle questioning might even be a way of ensuring
reliable answers. In addition, we have observed that direct questions can
threaten trust relationships or simply hurt feelings, regardless of whether the
information should be used in a subsequent decision. Recall our discussions of
251
252
child abuse reporting
and Tarasoff duties, for example. Moreover, norms
governing asking or telling come with a variety of costs, including information
losses and possible information overloads. No one can hope to deploy a single
variable, use or otherwise, to fully explain or justify the range of combinations
that we have examined.
In this spirit of subtlety, return now to our other two corner combinations.
Use norms are not persuasive explanations or defenses for either Don't Ask,
Must Tell or Must Ask, Don't Tell. MADT in the form of a code of silence is
the product of warring authorities, essentially ruling out the possibility of a
unified use norm to explain or justify the combination. Civil discovery clashes
similarly result from competing obligations to competing principals and
suggest basically nothing about what the finders of fact should do with the
underlying information. As for DAMT, conventional norms for infidelity
reflect a nuanced view that, while adultery is unethical or immoral for the
couple, questioning the loyalty of one's spouse without hard proof is also
problematic. After a spouse learns of a partner's infidelity, acting on this
information (including judging the partner harshly, demanding honest

250. See Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement ofLaw: When to Limit and When to Use
Technology, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Spr. 2008, at 12-15.
251. See supratext accompanying note 233.
252. See supratext accompanying note 169.

2015]

DON'TASK, MUST TELL

975

apologies, separating, and filing for divorce) is appropriate according to
mainstream values. One cannot easily derive the use rule from the asking and
telling rules, which point in opposite directions. On the one hand, the current
shift toward finessing the DAMT norm by asking third parties whether one's
spouse is faithful-searching web browser history or credit card bills, secretly
pursuing emails and text messages on a partner's smartphone, and so oneasily could be unstable, an artifact of an era where technology for detecting
snooping has not caught up with snooping tools in the mass consumer
253
marketplace.
On the other hand, when A asks C instead of B, A at least
avoids the risk of personal insult and trust-defying accusation, while sometimes
relieving C of a felt inhibition about bearing bad news.
This last point indicates a payoff for the nuances surrounding use norms.
Regardless of how the considerations net out for suspected infidelity and other
situations, the rapid expansion of Ask C opportunities is an occasion to stop
and think hard: Exactly why do and should we have any given combination of
asking and telling norms? Use norms plainly cannot explain everything. But
knowing whether use norms are important allows us to make progress in
evaluating contemporary asking and telling norms. The contemporary
academic literature on disclosure seems focused on the benefits from proper
use of disclosed information and the likelihood of nonuse or misuse, although
scholars worry about the costs of disclosure as well. 254 Use considerations do

matter often, but they provide little help in comprehending some combinations
of asking and telling rules. One also needs to consider power dynamics,
expectations in trust relationships, subtle forms of discrimination, agency
problems, and the pathologies of factional warfare. Understanding the
relationship between asking and telling is more complicated than understanding
telling in isolation.
B.

Beyond Q&A

We are writing at an odd moment. In 2015, the United States and, to a
lesser degree, other industrialized countries seem to be embracing Big Datathe combination of gigantic data sets with analytics designed to reveal patterns
that might predict future behavior. Feeding the developing algorithms is a
stream of information supplied via voluntary web postings, commercial
transactions, and high-tech surveillance in public places and work spaces that
255
was unimaginable a generation ago.
The United States is in the midst of a

253.

The potential elimination of this longstanding asymmetry is a theme developed in DAVID

BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM? (1998).
254. See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 219, at 43-93, 104-06, 169-82.

255. See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
393, 397-403 (2014); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policingby Numbers: Big Data and the FourthAmendment,
89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 38-42 (2014).
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"Reputation Revolution," where it is becoming easier for firms, governments,
and ordinary people to learn a great many facts about any citizen without ever
asking that person a direct question. 256 As a result, maybe the traditional form
of asking and telling is becoming pass6. What are the implications for social
norms and legal regimes when A can ask C (or watch B instead of asking B)
and get the same or better information more easily than ever before?
Suppose two potential student roommates, Alan and Bob, are trying to
assess each other's compatibility. It is likely that they will have a conversation
with one another, in person or virtually. But it is equally likely that they will
Google each other, examine each other's Facebook pages and Twitter feeds,
interrogate mutual acquaintances, and generally obtain more information from
third parties than they will acquire directly from each other. Things would have
been different a decade ago, and maybe they will be different a decade from
now. But for the time being, this reliance on third parties is widespread and
257
To some degree, reliance on third parties may render social
significant.
norms or laws that limit asking or telling obsolete. Observers are sometimes in
the habit of concluding that new technology tends to make a regulation
ineffective, perhaps especially when the traditional rules were legally
questionable anyway.
An automatic shift to "May Ask C, C May Tell" would be too quick,
however. Even if the old rules for A and B will no longer inhibit information
flows, the old reasons for those rules might still apply. Alan asking Bob's
friends about Bob's sexuality, academic aptitude, or neatness may be no less
gauche than Alan asking Bob these questions directly. Indeed, asking third
parties might be normatively worse from an anti-use perspective: doing so may
suggest to others that the trait is too awful for discussion with Bob, or
otherwise allow Alan to advertise a harmful interest in Bob's traits without
confronting Bob or without Alan confronting his own reasons for inquiring.
And while formal law likely has little effect on the sorts of disclosures that
Bob's friends would make to Alan, social norms might fill the gap. Moreover,
relevant provisions like the Fair Credit Reporting Act,258 privacy tort law,259 or
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act260 will substantially affect which

facts about Bob third parties such as Apple, Verizon, or Bank of America are
willing to share with Alan. If the old norms that regulated Q&A between Alan
and Bob were based on use concerns, those concerns easily can carry forward
to Ask C situations, albeit with updated and imperfect regulatory tools. On the
other hand, if the old norms were only based on, say, protecting people like

256. See STRAHLEVITZ, supra note 230, at 127-33.
257. See id.
258. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1127 (1970) (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§
1681-1681t (2012)).
259.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

260.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012).

§ 652

(1977).
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Bob from getting their feelings hurt when they face direct questions about
hygiene-and protecting people like Alan from inadvertently insulting othersthen there might be no reason for controlling Ask C efforts, whether high or
low tech.
A very different response to Ask C opportunities is to move toward use
rules. Society might let information flow freely but constrain Alan's ability to
use it. As Scott Peppet explains, these Don't Use rules arise in a number of
contexts. To borrow one example he provides, the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act was enacted by Congress in 2008 to prevent the use of
261
genetic information by insurers.
Preventing an orchestra from determining
the gender of someone auditioning to join it and preventing the orchestra from
making the performer's gender relevant to its decision about which musician to
select are alternative mechanisms to achieve the same ends. Which mechanism
is better depends on various factors, but where the commitment to stamp out a
vice (like gender discrimination in classical music) is strong enough, it may be
prudent to combine both strategies.262 Civil discovery rules similarly work

together to govern both the circumstances under which information should be
exchanged (i.e., responsive yet not privileged or work product) and the
appropriate uses when a privileged document is accidentally disclosed (i.e.,
263
admissible or inadmissible).
The connection between legal restrictions on
obtaining information and restrictions on using the information obtained was
264
noted long ago.
Of course, the trade-offs between Q&A norms and use norms are
changing. Many people take for granted that determining whether a decision
maker accessed information is usually easier than determining whether she
used that information to make a decision. Access and receipt often can be
proven objectively, but decision making may be opaque enough to leave an
external observer relying on the decision maker's statements about what was in
his or her head plus the observer's own hunches about the decision maker's
credibility. These generalizations now deserve challenge, however. As more
economic activity moves online and finds its way into datasets, the same Big
Databases that are used to identify behavioral patterns and generate predictions
can also be used to track anomalies in hiring, termination, promotion,
evaluations, and the like. The secretly racist boss or police officer can be
revealed-algorithmically-provided the system knows the races of those

261. See Peppet, supra note 5, at 1200 (citing Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881, 883-904).
262.
Cf STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 230, at 159 ("[W]e can achieve more with four tools than
we can with three.").
263. See supraPart II.D.2.
264. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, OfDiariesand DataBanks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEx. L. REV. 49, 51 (1995) (arguing that "the reasonableness of a seizure extends to
the uses that law enforcement authorities make of property and infornation even after a lawful
seizure"); see also BAIRD ET AL., supra note 5, at 91-93.
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subject to his discretion and can compare him with unbiased decision makers
265
who interact with similar populations.
For most of our history, the collection
of information has been more transparent than its use. This made restricting
collection the most practical route available for legal or social reformers
concerned with privacy, power, or other interests. But as collection (via third
parties or surveillance) has become less transparent, use has become more so,
at least in some contexts. This dynamic, combined with American
exceptionalism where free speech is concerned, 266 suggests that use restrictions
will take on increased importance to support old commitments under new
circumstances.
There will even be instances in which people will value nondisclosure so
much that seemingly airtight combinations of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't
Use" will be deemed inadequate. This situation describes the law in at least
267
fourteen states with respect to trade secrets.
In its famous 1995 opinion in
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, the Seventh Circuit considered claims against
William Redmond, a former Pepsi manager. He had defected to the Quaker
Oats Company (which owned Gatorade, Snapple, and other beverages) while
he still possessed trade secret knowledge about PepsiCo's pricing and
marketing plans.268 Embracing the doctrine of "inevitable disclosure," the court
held that Redmond should be enjoined from working for Quaker until the
inside knowledge he had about Pepsi's pricing and marketing strategies for the
coming year became stale.269 The injunction would survive notwithstanding
Redmond's agreeing to disclose none of Pepsi's secrets to Quaker and
Quaker's promises not to use any of Redmond's confidential information.270 As
the court put it, "PepsiCo finds itself in the position of a coach, one of whose
players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big
game."271 The court said it was inevitable that Redmond would use Pepsi's
confidential information in his capacity as a manager for a company in direct
competition with Pepsi, and in light of this inevitability, the only solution was
272
to prevent him from working there.
It is initially hard to imagine other instances in which confidentiality is
treated as sufficiently important to justify not only restrictions on asking,

265. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How s Ay Driving?"for Everyone (and Everything?), 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1734 (2006).
266. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Constitutions of Hope and Fear, 124 YALE L.J. 528, 556
(2014) (book review).
267. See Barry L. Cohen, The Current Status of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine,
LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2010, at 40, 43 ("Seven states have rejected outright the use of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. Fourteen states have applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine on at least one
occasion.").
268. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
269. Id. at 1272.
270. See id. at 1270.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 1271.
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restrictions on telling, and restrictions on using, but also restrictions on the
establishment of relationships themselves. Yet the trade secrets example is not
unique. Law firms routinely are required to turn away lucrative work because
of conflicts of interest that could arise with respect to the firm's existing
clients. A well-enforced DADT rule presumably would build in sufficient
precautions to prevent inappropriate knowledge spillovers from affecting the
work that lawyers do. But law instead prohibits the work from flowing to the
273
conflicted firm in the absence of the affected party's consent.
Or take
security clearances. For people with high-level clearances, telling is forbidden,
as are uses outside of one's capacity as a government employee. For those
deemed nontrustworthy, a variant of PepsiCo is implemented: applicants will
not be permitted to work for the agency at all if their trustworthiness cannot be
established ex ante.274
Finally, there are similar implications for Must Ask norms. Increasing
opportunities for Ask C solutions can render duties to gather information from
third parties more appealing, at least when a Must Ask or Must Tell norm is
based on a desire to ensure that the information is used in decision making.
Direct Q&A is often encumbered by reliability problems associated with selfreporting in any event. Querying third parties and databases sometimes is a
more reliable information-gathering strategy, and such queries are becoming
faster and cheaper every year. Consider what the IRS does when a known
income earner fails to file a tax return. Instead of giving up, the IRS may draw
on information already gathered in federal government data banks to
effectively fill out a tax return for the non-filer and then pursue collection
275
remedies.
We can imagine a similar practice of investigation becoming a
social or legal duty of employers and sellers in restricted markets (or maybe the
duty of their government regulators) where the politics are conducive and
where efficient screening can be done by accessing databases. State law causes

273. See, e.g., Roy D. Mercer, LLC v. Reynolds, 292 P.3d 466, 475-76 (N.M. 2012); Maritrans
GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1286-87 (Pa. 1992).
274. This realm of American law notably puts no restrictions on journalists' ability to ask
questions about matters that are classified, and First Amendment doctrine limits the ability of the
government to sanction the publication of information that is disclosed in violation of a Don't Tell
duty. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Pentagon Papers, NAT'L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers/ (last visited June 28, 2014). Don't Associate rules
might be a predictable substitute when Don't Ask and Don't Tell are hobbled, legally or
technologically. Classified information leaked by Edward Snowden, who was a government contractor
apparently unaffected by any culture of government loyalty among long-term officials, indicates the
importance and imperfections of ex ante screening. But Big Data will help here, too.
275. This practice shows up in litigated cases in which (non)taxpayers continue to resist tax
assessments. See, e.g., United States v. Silkman, 220 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding taxpayer liable
for substitute return determined by the IRS when taxpayer failed to file a return and disclose relevant
information).
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of action for negligent hiring already create such duties in some jurisdictions.27
As with Don't Ask norms, however, Must Ask and Must Tell norms are not
always built on commitments regarding the use of information. So, again,
perhaps no change in practices will be warranted if the reason for mandating
questions is, for instance, to convey respect for another person's judgment
without demanding that it be exercised in a particular direction.
C. Reform
The norms we introduce in this Article are sticky, but they can change
over time. Christian wedding officiants no longer crowdsource the question of
277
whether nuptials should proceed, as we noted above.
The new norm is
DAMT, at least where there is a close enough relationship between the party
possessing explosive information and either member of the couple. This shift
makes sense, given the infrequency with which anyone attending a wedding
accepted the officiant's invitation to speak against the union's wisdom. Shifting
the conversation-initiation duty to the party with the information likely has the
further effect of promoting early disclosure, so that a doomed wedding could
be called off, ideally before the wedding invitations are sent, thereby keeping a
lid on the gossip-worthy turn of events and saving nuptial-related expenditures.
The increased availability of Ask C options might also have empowered brides
and grooms to do due diligence on each other, thereby reducing the probability
278
that skeletons will be hiding in the closets of his or her intended.
On balance,
the norms appear to have changed for the better.
The law of Q&A changes, too, in major and minor ways. Over a number
of years our criminal trial system shifted hard from Don't Ask, Don't Tell,
which prohibited criminal defendants from testifying, to May Ask, May Tell,
which left the matter to the defendant's option. 279 Our first extreme example in
this Article-the U.S. military's limited DADT policy-also crumbled as use
norms shifted and turned into something like Don't Ask, May Tell. Don't Tell
rules for gays in the military have gone the way of Must Tell rules governing
280
Communist Party membership,
largely in response to changing popular

276. See, e.g., Underberg v. S. Alarm, Inc., 643 S.E.2d 374, 376-78 (Ga. App. 2007)
(subjecting an alarm company to potential liability where it failed to conduct a background check on
an independent contractor who kidnapped the plaintiff, a client of the company).
277. See supratext accompanying note 199.
278. See Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357, 368 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a suspicious
mother did not have a right under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to obtain credit information about her
daughter's fiance, but reserving the question of whether the daughter might have done so without
violating the statute based on the possibility that a marriage is a "consumer transaction" under section
1681b(a)(3) of the statute), abrogatedon other grounds by Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47 (2007).
279. See supranote 239 and accompanying text.
280. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (upholding a contempt conviction
based on Barenblatt's refusal to answer a congressional committee's questions about whether he was a
member of the Communist Party).
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attitudes about morality and the seriousness of perceived threats to social
stability. In a pro-regulatory direction, consider the developing restrictions on
employer questions to support antidiscrimination goals. And, to add a recent
illustration, consider Transportation Security Administration (TSA) airport
screening. TSA used to require that every boarding passenger be asked whether
"anyone unknown to you has asked you to carry an item onto this flight" and
whether "any of the items you are traveling with [have] been out of your
immediate control since the time you packed them."281 The questions were
implemented after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and two near misses
where terrorists had apparently deceived their girlfriends into carrying
282
explosives hidden in their suitcases onto planes.
The questions were
eliminated in 2002, after inefficiency complaints built up and evidence of
283
terrorism prevention failed to materialize.
Air travelers no longer get
284
reminders of such residual risks via repetitious questioning,
but TSA insisted
that it would continue to raise awareness through automated announcements in
285
It does not appear that airline employees ever exercise discretion to
airports.
ask such questions today. Perhaps the concern is that letting employees ask the
question of some customers would reveal an unsavory form of racial profiling,
such that asking everyone and asking no one are the most palatable
286
possibilities.
Our framework for analyzing Q&A norms should be illuminating in
several ways, one of them being intelligent and critical evaluation of existing
policy well beyond a TSA choice to announce instead of ask. Before
concluding, we will sketch a few other instances in which reasonable people
may conclude that society could do better by altering particular asking and
telling rules.
One straightforward suggestion involves employment discrimination law.
We have seen that Don't Use norms in antidiscrimination laws are not always
287
backed up by legal restrictions on asking, let alone telling.
Although our
sense is that there is relatively little unraveling in employment markets with
respect to issues like planned pregnancies that may require a job applicant to
take parental leave, the behavior may be sufficiently troubling to warrant a
DADT legal rule. Particularly in small companies with generous parental leave
policies, extended leaves can impose real short-term costs on a firm and on
coworkers. If a female job seeker credibly articulates a lack of interest in

281.

Tom McCann, 2 Questions No Longer PartofAirportRoutine, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 30, 2002,

at 1.
282.
283.
Some Say,
284.
285.
286.
287.

See id.
See Marcella Bombardieri, Baggage Questions Unanswered: Check-In Aantra Worked,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2002, at B 1.
See id. (raising this concern).
See McCann, supra note 281.
For further discussion, see note 296 below.
See supraPart II.A.2.
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becoming a parent any time soon, a boss may have a hard time not
disadvantaging other applicants for the same position who have or might have
such family plans, even if using information in this way would constitute
unlawful discrimination in the relevant jurisdiction.288 For the same reason that
some orchestras have musicians audition behind screens that prevent those
evaluating the music from learning the performer's race, gender, or age, a firm
might demonstrate its commitment to gender equality in hiring by prohibiting
interviewers from asking and prohibiting applicants from telling about their
parenting plans. Law can reinforce such commitments, and it can help deter
employers from exploiting burgeoning Ask C options. Such extensions of law
would follow ongoing concern about certain topics being foregrounded in the
employment context, importantly motivated by Don't Use norms.
A very different recommendation would liberalize Q&A in the workplace
and rely more heavily on Don't Use norms. As we mentioned above, employer
ability to work around Don't Ask norms is increasing along with observers'
ability to identify possible instances of discriminatory decisions. Big Data and
pervasive surveillance can be and is directed at many targets, some of them
relatively powerful. If the enforcement of Don't Use norms in employment
becomes reliable enough, then important good can be accomplished by opening
lines of questions and responses on heretofore legally sensitive subjects.
Regulating Q&A certainly can be useful, but, as we observed at the outset, that
strategy entails information losses. Questions can be the simplest way to avoid
mutual misunderstanding about each other's abilities, values, and other traits,
without depending on guesswork or third-party estimations. Coworkers might
be more satisfied with their jobs when they feel free to discuss a variety of
topics at the water cooler, and they might better understand how to adjust
standard operating procedures so that the firm flourishes economically. Silence
is the enemy of accommodation.
More counterintuitively, such workplace openness might be an
unintended side effect of courts tinkering with a Must Ask norm in disability
accommodation cases.289 This approach is contrary to the suggestion in the
Tenth Circuit's Abercrombie opinion that questions about religion are off-

288. See Cleese v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 911 F. Supp. 1312, 1318 (D. Or. 1995) (indicating
that, at least when the plaintiff is receiving in vitro fertilization treatments, the federal Pregnancy
Discrimination Act covers the employee before conception "if the employer has the requisite intent to
discriminate against an employee because she is ... planning to become [pregnant] in the near
future"); Pacourekv. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1400-01 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (similar). Housing
discrimination is similar but trickier. A very strong commitment to ending residential racial
segregation might justify supplementing Don't Tell anti-steering rules with Don't Ask restrictions for
home buyers. But informing home buyers of their Don't Ask obligations could backfire by stimulating
their interest in the forbidden fruit of neighborhood demographic information, which they can obtain
lawfully via the Internet and other Ask C portals. See Wiggin, supranote 236.
289.

See supranote 165.
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limits until the employee raises the issue.290 Although both approaches are
regulatory and neither is free from major problems, each likely will have a
different effect on the comfortable exchange of information in a typically
awkward conversational situation. Suppose that an employer has some kind of
legal duty to ask whether applicants or employees face difficulties complying
with standard workplace rules without any accommodation. Must Ask surely
would tend to increase employer information on applicant and employee traits,
with the attendant opportunity for bad use of the new data. But these questions
have upside potential, as well, for both sides of the conversation. A clear legal
duty to ask the question would dampen or eliminate litigation risk from
initiating productive conversations about accommodations. And it should kill
any unwelcoming signal that an employee might see in discretionary
questioning about disability or religion. Compelled questions can have these
effects. 291
Next, recall our discussion of the prevalence of MADT in civil discovery
and its decision to impose few duties on the party seeking discovery to reduce
292
the probability that privileged information will be erroneously produced.
At
a macro-level, the American legal system's comfort with an unusual MADT
regime in this setting reflects the generally adversarial character of the
litigation system that we have built, tempered by modest efforts to preserve a
degree of gentility and efficiency. Given what we wrote earlier about highstakes discovery, the following subversive questions now seem natural: Does
litigation have to be that way? Can we imagine a system closer to trust-based
DAMT than adversarial MADT? After all, the design of our litigation system
has never been set in stone and always has been a mixture of adversarial,
293
inquisitorial, managerial, and other models.
Consider one alternative. At the
outset of litigation, the lawyer for party A would stand up and say, "Here are
the strong points of our case, and here are all the reasons why my own client's
case is weak and the other side should win." The lawyer for party B would then

290. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 2013)
(involving religion and its accommodation in the workplace), rev d, 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
291. Appropriately framing the required question would be challenging but not impossible.
During oral argument in Abercrombie, Justice Alito wondered whether the EEOC would tolerate an
employer describing its workplace rules and then asking applicants whether they "have any problem
with that." Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, No. 14-86
(2015). This formulation might be a little gruff and it was not clearly suggested as a mandatory
question, but the discussion during oral argument could be a starting point. The Supreme Court's
decision did not offer guidance on what employers may, must not, or must ask applicants and
employees. See supranote 140.
292. See supraPart II.D.2.
293. See, e.g., Amalia D. Kessler, Our InquisitorialTradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process,
and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005) (arguing that

the problems of today's largely adversarial system could be resolved by emphasizing our quasiinquisitorial equity tradition); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of CriminalJustice, 66

FORDHAML. REv. 2117 (1998) (claiming that, in practice, the American litigation system is more akin
to a non-adversarial administrative system of justice than an adversarial model).
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stand up and do likewise. Having heard a candid assessment of the strengths
and weaknesses of each party's case, the lawyers could then presumably
hammer out a settlement reflecting the relative positions of each party. If the
rules are effective, asking becomes a pointless waste of client money. Perfect
294
telling obviates the need to ask. It sounds dreamy,
but there is an obvious
problem of incentives. Lawyers will be rewarded when their clients achieve
good results, and if there is no one auditing the veracity of a lawyer's
confessions about his client's strengths and weaknesses, then there will be an
overwhelming temptation to shade the truth in a manner that makes the client's
case look stronger than it is.
And yet in the highly adversarial context of criminal discovery, the Brady
doctrine requires prosecutors to hand over exculpatory or impeachment
295
evidence to defense counsel.
The failure to do so may result in an acquittal.
What seems unrealistic on the civil side is constitutionally compulsory on one
side of the criminal context, where the prosecutor has immense power over the
296
accused as well as public responsibilities.
The duty to avoid asking questions
that unduly risk prompting mistaken disclosures by the other side in civil
litigation might be less radical than the government's Must Tell duty to
disclose information adverse to its prospects for conviction. Consider then the
following modest reform: litigation in which the government is seeking
substantial civil penalties against firms or individuals should be structured so
297
that the state has Brady-style Must Tell obligations.
More ambitiously, we

294. Perhaps some plea bargaining negotiations between prosecutors and public defenders who
see each other every day can be characterized by this level of candor and professionalism.
295. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012) (restricting
defendant access to witness statements to the government before and after they testify).
296. In the Brady context, one commentator recently suggested going further. In Jason Kreag's
view, Brady's structure (which we characterize as May Ask, Must Tell) is inadequate to protect the
rights of criminal defendants; prosecutors too often ignore their disclosure obligations. See Jason
Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 47 (2014). Although he does not use this
terminology, Kreag winds up proposing something close to a MAMIT regime to govern Brady courts
would as a matter of course ask a series of questions to prosecutors in open court to ensure that they
had complied with their Brady obligations. See id. at 49-57. In his discussion of the costs and benefits
of his proposal, Kreag hints at one of the broader themes that we have explored herein. Compare id. at
56 ("[S]ome prosecutors might be insulted by having to answer these or similar questions from the
court, believing that the questions themselves amount to an accusation."), with text accompanying
notes 148-58 (discussing the same dynamics in the context of personal relationships) and text
accompanying note 235 (discussing those dynamics in the context of relationships between children
and adult authority figures). It is hard to make sense of the hurt feelings concern in a MIAMIT context,
however. If spouses were legally obligated to ask their partners whether they had been faithful during
the previous week, and everybody complied with the law, no rational person would hold a grudge
about the question being posed. Indeed, the avoidance of suspicious "singling out" presents an
important argument for compulsory asking regimes. See supra text accompanying note 286.
297. See Justin Goetz, Note, Holding Fast the Keys to the Kingdom: FederalAdministrative
Agencies and the Need for Brady Disclosure, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1424, 1428-45 (2011). On the
phenomenon of corporate civil liability, see Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-ProfitPublic
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REv. 853 (2014); A Mammoth Guilt Trip: CorporateAmerica is Finding
it Ever Harderto Stay on the Right Side ofthe Law, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 2014.
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can imagine a sufficiently robust auditing mechanism that could make DAMT
work for all civil discovery. Suppose that in one of every twenty cases, an
inspector general assessed the veracity of a lawyer's representations about his
or her client's case. This auditor would be entitled to see everything that the
lawyer saw and to second guess every characterization. Penalties for shading
the truth could be as severe as necessary. Conceivably this would be an
improvement over the status quo, although the proposal admittedly is not
clearly compatible with the interests of those invested in the existing system.
To canvass another domain for possible reform, one might worry that
while FOIA does an adequate job of ensuring the transparency of shallow
government secrets, the program breaks down when it comes to deep secretsthe unknown unknowns of state conduct.298 For this reason, commentators have
proposed second-order disclosure requirements, whereby the executive must
disclose information to Congress or the public in order to ensure that critical
programs' existence is not kept secret from people who have oversight
responsibilities but lack the creativity to anticipate that such programs have
been implemented.299 The effect of these executive disclosure requirements,
which have been implemented in a few domains,300 is to help ensure that the
government's telling is not made contingent on anyone's asking.
Finally, in exploring reform options, the universe is not limited to policies
that already combine asking and telling regulations. Rather, readers might
identify any information flow problem that concerns them and then ask how
different combinations of asking and telling rules might address it. There are
countless such problems in society, but let us use gender pay disparities for
illustration. One significant contributor to the problem of pay disparity is that
301
men are more likely than women to initiate negotiations regarding raises.
Valuable recent scholarship proposes using disclosure strategies to counteract
302
the pay gap.
But some research suggests that men generally ask to make
more than their peers and women systematically ask to make the same salary as
peers.303 Disclosure will not counteract that dynamic, but other mechanisms
could. Perhaps firms found liable for pay discrimination should be allowed to
implement a gender-sensitive regime of existing salary transparency: DAMT

298. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 121
(1996); Samaha, supra note 70, at 920 n.41, 948.
299. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 326-33 (2010).
300. See id.
301. See Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence
from a Large Scale Natural Field Experiment (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
18511, Nov. 2012). See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK:
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE 19-20 (2003).

302. See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based
Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951 (2011); Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The
Casefor Workplace Transparency,63 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2011).
303. See Lisa A. Barron, Ask and You Shall Receive? Gender Differences in Negotiators'
BeliefsAboutRequestsfor aHigherSalary, 56 HUMAN RELATIONS 635,643-44 (2003).
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for female employees and DADT for male employees. 3 04 During annual

performance reviews women (but not men) would hear what their peers are
earning, and all parties would be prohibited from asking about salary
information to ameliorate the disparities that stem from men's disproportionate
tendency to solicit salary information as a precursor to salary negotiations. The
evidence suggests that, once armed with information about peer salaries,
women would seek pay that brings them closely into line with what male peers
305
are earning.
Such a regime might achieve the same egalitarian results as an
alternative remedy, such as ongoing judicial monitoring of male and female
salaries, at a much lower cost, given the difficulty courts and other outside
monitors have in determining whether any particular employees of a firm
deserve the same pay.
Readers may disagree that these reforms would be desirable, which is
fine. Our goal here is not to promote any particular set of changes. Rather, by
highlighting the relationship between asking and telling, we want to encourage
readers to identify their own examples of policies and norms that are currently
situated in questionable boxes. Structured thinking about asking and telling in
conjunction can open a host of controversial and interesting possibilities.
CONCLUSION

There has been virtually no legal scholarship on the dynamic relationship
between asking and telling rules, which are two building blocks for human
relationships. We are interested in moving beyond monologues. We want to
understand conversations involving asking and telling, and the various
constraints that legal and social systems place on them. A skeptic might
wonder whether combining the study of asking and telling rules yields insights
that looking at them in isolation would not. This Article shows that the answer
is yes. Questions are a special device for information collection embedded
within an interactive social practice involving the exchange of information.
Lawyers of all people should understand that the process of information
revelation is no less important than the consequences of information revelation.
Regulating the process of asking and telling influences the substantive
outcomes of conversations. Perhaps more surprisingly, such regulation can
change the preferences and relationships of the conversation participants.
Moreover, regulation of Q&A may be driven by goals apart from the proper
use of information. So getting the disclosure rules exactly right, which is not
really possible, is only part of the challenge. In any event, if we look only at the

304. We are raising a policy option here, not claiming that such differential treatment complies
with Title VII in its current form.
305.

Cf Mary E. Wade, Women and Salary Negotiation: The Costs of Self-Advocacy, 25

WOMEN Q. 65, 72-73 (2001) (reviewing social science evidence suggesting that, when
women discover they are underpaid compared to peers, they promptly began requesting higher
salaries).
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regulation of telling or the regulation of asking, we will walk away with an
insufficient understanding of what makes our legal and social systems tick.
In investigating a large array of domains for asking and telling, we have
stressed that sound evaluation must account for both social norms and legal
rules. When put together, we can make sense of some extraordinary
combinations of asking and telling rules-and we can more precisely criticize
some other combinations. But even this much is not enough, because asking
and telling rules are only sometimes related to use rules. And because
opportunities for people to work around existing asking and telling rules are
rapidly expanding with new technology and analytics, we will have to rethink
some old rules. Getting a good picture of these moving parts is a difficult task,
but an exciting one, too. We are encouraged that the answers to the questions
we pose are multifaceted. The world is a complicated place, probably more so
as technology and rules shift. Monocausal explanations and unidimensional
justifications for broad social phenomena rarely withstand scrutiny. In this
initial effort, we have attempted to identify major questions that other scholars
will feel inspired-or even compelled-to answer.
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